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ARTICLE
Astroturf Activism
Melissa J. Durkee I
Abstract. Corporate influence in government is more than a national issue; it is an
international phenomenon. For years, businesses have been infiltrating international legal
processes. They secretly lobby lawmakers through front groups: "astroturf' imitations of
grassroots organizations. But because this business lobbying is covert, it has been
underappreciated in both the literature and the law. This Article unearths the "astroturf
activism" phenomenon. It offers an original descriptive account that classifies modes of
business access to international officials and identifies harms, then develops a critical
analysis of the laws that regulate this access. I show that the perplexing set of access rules
for aspiring international lobbyists creates the transparency problem I identify by
prohibiting all but covert business access. I argue that the access rules have been rendered
obsolete by globalization and fundamental changes in relationships between national
governments and multinational business entities. To that historical critique, this Article
adds an efficiency account and an evaluation of the law's conceptual coherence that draws
from pluralistic theory. The analysis gives rise to two potential avenues for reform. One
proposal would require enhanced disclosures, and the other would offer formal access to
business entities, engaging business input but also exposing it. Either potential reform
would update the law to better accommodate contemporary business roles in international
governance. The stakes, I show, are high. On the one hand, business can offer lawmakers
expertise and politically neutral solutions. On the other hand, unchecked business
influence can obstruct and neutralize laws aimed at solving critical global problems.
* Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. This Article advances a
larger project that explores how business entities shape the content and effect of
international treaties. For invaluable comments I thank Erez Aloni, Julian Arato, Pamela
Bookman, Sarah Dadush, Stavros Gadinis, Jean Galbraith, Maggie Gardner, Catherine
Hardee, Rob Knowles, Lisa Manheim, Cornel Marian, Anita Ramasastry, Zahr Said,
Gregory Shaffer; participants at workshops at the American Society of International Law
Research Forum, the JILSA Annual Meeting at the University of Pennsylvania, the
Corporate Law in Society CRN at the Law and Society Annual Meeting, and the Second
Annual Business and Human Rights Scholars Conference; and participants at law faculty
colloquiums at the University of Illinois and the University of Washington. Thanks also
to the excellent editorial team at the Stanford Law Review and, for exceptional research
assistance, to Laura Daugherty and Carolyn White.
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Introduction
A newer kind of national business organization is the corporate front group
which presents itself to the community as an NGO rather than a business
organization.... These "astroturf" (as distinct from grass-roots) NGOs ... are the
most sincere form of flattery the business community pays to the efficacy of
social movement politics.1
Citizens United v. FEC famously held that the First Amendment confers on
corporations the right to express themselves through unlimited spending on
political speech.2 The holding allegedly unleashed a torrent of corporate
political spending 3 and certainly sparked a vigorous public debate about
corporate rights to participate in the U.S. lawmaking process.4 The Citizens
United debate has featured a sharp critique by President Obama, "a flurry" of
proposed fixes in Congress, campaigns to amend the U.S. Constitution, and an
avalanche of academic commentary and public protest.5
But the attention stops at the border. The scholarly and popular uproar is
focused on corporate participation in U.S. domestic political processes; it does
1. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 489 (2000)
(offering as examples of astroturf NGOs "Consumers for World Trade (a pro-GATT
industry coalition), Citizens for Sensible Control of Acid Rain (a coal and electricity
industry front), and the National Wetlands Coalition (US oil company and real estate
developers)").
2. 558 U.S. 310, 340, 365 (2010) (holding 5-4 that the First Amendment prohibits the
government from restricting independent political expenditures by corporate entities).
3. This corporate political spending is said to be channeled secretly, through "dark
money" and Super PACs. See Gabrielle Levy, How Citizens United Has Changed Politics in
5 Years, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2015/01/21/5-years-later-citizens-united-has-remade-us-politics
(arguing that Citizens United has resulted in a "deluge of cash poured into so-called super
PACs-particularly single-candidate PACs, or political action committees-which are
only nominally independent from the candidates they support" and that "much of this
spending, known as'dark money,' never has to be publicly disclosed").
4. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REv. 143, 143
(2010) ("Citizens United v. FEC unleashed a torrent of popular criticism . . . ." (footnote
omitted)); see also, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political
Speech. Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REv. 83, 83-85 (2010) (noting that "[c]onstitutional law
scholars will long debate the wisdom" of Citizens United and offering a corporate law
analysis of its implications); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of
Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 583 (2011) (arguing that Citizens United "amplified
other significant, incoherent aspects of the [Court's] campaign finance jurisprudence").
5. Sullivan, supra note 4, at 143; see also Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The
Constitutional Right that Big Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 639, 639 (2011) (discussing how the opinion "captured the public imagina-
tion").
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not extend to legal systems beyond U.S. borders.6 The truth is that businesses
also carry expressive rights in international legal processes.7 In particular,
businesses are able to secretly gain access to international officials by
exploiting an obscure set of rules developed by the Economic and Social
Council ("the Council" or ECOSOC), an organ of the United Nations. Businesses
do this by creating or commandeering nonprofit associations, which in turn
register as "consultants" with special rights to advise international officials.
Businesses thus work covertly through nonprofit groups to exploit the special
access those organizations enjoy.8 I call this phenomenon "astroturf activism"
in international law.9
6. The press captured news of backroom deals by business lobbyists during the secretive
negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. See Melissa J. Durkee, The Business of
Treaties, 63 UCLA L. REV. 264, 266 n.1 (2016) ("[T]he majority of Congress is being kept
in the dark as to the substance of the [Trans-Pacific Partnership] negotiations, while
representatives of U.S. corporations-like Halliburton, Chevron, PHRMA, Comcast,
and the Motion Picture Association of America-are being consulted and made privy to
details of the agreement." (alterations in original) (quoting 158 CONG. REc. S3517 (daily
ed. May 23, 2012) (statement of Sen. Wyden))); Taylor Wofford, What Is the Trans-
Pacific Partnership and Why Are Critics Upset by It?, NEWSWEEK (June 12, 2015, 1:12 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/what-tpp-trade-deal-342449 ("(D]rafts of the agreement
[are] under lock and key, although some 700 'cleared advisers,' most of them corporate
lobbyists, have been able to read it and make suggestions."). But little is known and
written about the mechanisms and effects of business influence on international treaty
production. See Durkee, supra, at 266-67 (arguing that "the mechanisms, extent, and
effects of business participation" in treatymaking are "understudied and underappreci-
ated"); Gregory C. Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 147, 150 (2009) (proposing this area of research); Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing
International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1595-601 (2011) (noting a lack of information
about the degree and effect of corporate participation in international lawmaking).
7. See Part I below for an examination of the legal rules that give rise to these rights,
specifically Article 71 of the United Nations Charter and subsequent accreditation rules
developed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council pursuant to Article 71.
8. See Part I.C below for an examination of this legal structure.
9. This Article is not the first to use the term "astroturf" to refer to corporate use of the
"grassroots" form. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 489 (using the term
"astroturf NGOs" to refer to corporate front groups). Indeed, the term "astroturf
activism" itself has appeared in the press in various contexts. See, e.g., "Astroturf
Activism'" Leaked Memo Reveals Oil Industry Effort to Stage Rallies Against Climate
Legislation, DEMOCRACY NoW! (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.democracynow.org/
2009/8/21/astroturf-activism_1eaked-memo-reveals-oil (alleging that the American
Petroleum Institute asked oil companies to recruit their employees to participate in
rallies against climate change legislation); George Joseph & StudentNation, Astroturf
Activism: Who Is Behind Students for Education Reform?, NATION (Jan. 11, 2013),
https://www.thenation.com/article/astroturf-activism-who-behind-students
-education-reform (alleging that the organization "Students for Education Reform" is a
front for a corporate lobbying firm). This Article adopts the "astroturf activism" term
in a new context to refer to the phenomenon this Article uncovers whereby corpora-
tions use nonprofit NGOs as front groups to advance business interests through the
U.N. consultancy system.
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Astroturf activism, facilitated by dysfunctional legal rules, obscures
business influence in international lawmaking, casts suspicion on legitimate
public interest organizations (often called "nongovernmental organizations" or
NGOs), and blunts the power of international actors to effectively regulate
corporate access.10 It also sacrifices the expertise and efficiency benefits
businesses might offer lawmakers in a well-regulated process."
This Article offers an original study to uncover and describe the astroturf
activism phenomenon in the context of international organizations such as the
the Council and a theory of the legal failures that produce the phenomenon.
The argument is this: astroturf activism is the product of archaic access rules
that fail to accommodate drastically altered relationships between two sets of
actors. Those actors are, on the one hand, national governments and their
international lawmakers and, on the other, the business sector, which has
exploded in size and global influence since the early twentieth century when
the access rules were developed. The flaws in the law, I argue, are rooted in
obsolescence.
This obsolescence yields perverse incentives toward covert behavior,
forcing businesses to dissemble or lose out on access to officials and
lawmakers.12 The resulting harm stretches in two directions: In one direction,
the law provides an incentive for business to infiltrate the NGO world in a way
that attenuates accountability, mixes messages, and threatens the legitimacy of
NGO participation in international lawmaking.13 In the other direction, the
law curbs the effectiveness of contributions businesses can make to
lawmaking. 14 It forces businesses to aggregate into associations that may be
poor fits for their expertise and agendas, provide lowest-common-
denominator proposals, or capture the agendas of weaker public interest
organizations.15 The law also taxes the resources of gatekeepers-who have
insufficient mechanisms to judge between different would-be participants in
the international process-and institutional decisionmakers-who face an
onslaught of input from often-veiled sources. 16
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See generally Durkee, supra note 6, at 306-11 (showing that business participation in
international law production can sometimes be beneficial, as businesses can contribute
expertise, break geopolitical logjams, and offer efficient solutions).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.C.1-2.
14. See infra Part II.C.4.
15. See infra Part II.C.4.
16. See infra Part II.C.3. The project shares objectives with liberal theory in international
legal scholarship, which seeks to understand how interest groups shape international
law. The liberal account, however, focuses on the ways interest groups influence
domestic lawmakers, who in turn enter into international agreements. See, e.g., Oona A.
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1952-54
footnote continued on next page
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This project is both descriptive and critical. Descriptively, this Article
identifies the legal structure that creates the astroturf activism phenomenon
and its effects. To do so, this Article uses a multisource approach to uncover
forms of secret corporate access to lawmakers.17 It shows that the phenomenon
I describe as astroturf activism occurs in at least three modes: (1) businesses
capture existing NGOs or form their own NGOs with nonprofit status and
mission statements that obscure the company's true interests; (2) for-profit
entities exploit gatekeeping weaknesses to gain access notwithstanding their
noncompliance with eligibility rules; or (3) powerful businesses capture trade
associations that purport to speak on behalf of a wider range of actors in a
particular industry.18
What is the source of this covert mayhem? The astroturf activism practice
arises as businesses try to take advantage of "consultancy" status at internation-
al organizations like the Council or the World Health Organization (WHO).
The consultancy status offers special access to international officials and
lawmakers.19 Significantly, these consultative relationships are limited to
nonprofit associations and exclude for-profit corporations and other business
entities.20 Rather than sit on the sidelines, however, businesses surreptitiously
(2002) (identifying the core aims of liberal theory); see also Andrew Moravcsik, Taking
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 516-21
(1997) (elaborating liberal theory in international relations and explaining that
domestic constituencies construct state interests). Interest group pressures also play a
role in process-based accounts of law's development and reception. See, e.g., Eyal
Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 168-70 (1999)
(conceiving of the sovereign state as an agent of small interest groups); Rachel
Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 501, 502
(2004) (arguing that domestic interest groups can advocate for international agree-
ments in an attempt to influence domestic law and policy); Harold Hongju Koh, Why
Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2654-56 (1997) (reviewing Abram
Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with Interna-
tional Regulatory Agreements (1995); and Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International
Law and Institutions (1995)) (explaining that government officials, NGOs, "transna-
tional moral entrepreneurs," and business entities all generate norms that are later
formalized in international law). Those accounts, however, do not isolate the role of
business actors in lawmaking and study the effect of those business roles on interna-
tional law. There is much more to be understood.
17. For a description of this Article's research methods, see Part II.A below.
18. For an examination of these modes of access, see Part II.B below.
19. For a discussion of the rules governing this access, see Part I.B-C below. The legal roots
of this consultancy structure lie in the United Nations Charter, which empowers the
Council to make arrangements to consult with NGOs "concerned with matters within
its competence." U.N. Charter art. 71.
20. See infra Part I.C.1-2; see also Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status, NGO BRANCH:
DEP'T EcoN. & Soc. AFF., http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=30 (last visited Jan. 1, 2017)
(describing the groups anticipated by these criteria as "international, regional, sub-
regional, national non-governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, public
sector or voluntary organizations").
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find access through creating or co-opting the traditional NGO format.2 ' In fact,
a business literature even guides businesses in how to effectively gain access by
making use of the NGO form.22
Because much of this behavior is underground, little attention has been
paid to its significance.23 Yet, at the same time, a robust literature considers the
role of NGOs as a whole in international governance. 24 While this literature
sometimes cautions that NGO participation can lack accountability or
legitimacy, 25 it often celebrates NGOs as "democratizers" that exercise moral
authority and enhance the legitimacy of the international process. 26 Prominent
21. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 489 (explaining that these front or
captured NGOs do not present themselves as business organizations); Fairouz El Tom,
Diversity and Inclusion on NGO Boards: What the Stats Say, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2013,
5:56 AM EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals
-network/2013/apr/29/diversity-inclusion-ngo-board (finding that over half of the
"[t]op 100 NGOs" had one or more board members affiliated with companies that invest
in or provide services to the arms, tobacco, and finance industries); see also infra Part
II.B.
22. See Robert W. Fri, The Corporation as Nongovernment Organization, COLUM. J. WORLD
Bus., Fall & Winter 1992, at 90, 92-93 (recommending that business entities consider
participating in U.N. activities by sponsoring or partnering with NGOs); see also infra
Part II.B.2.
23. See generally Stephan, supra note 6, at 1577 (proposing that more attention be paid to
private sector influence on international lawmaking). By contrast, a robust literature
considers the role of business in standard setting, "bottom-up" lawmaking, and
regulatory cooperation. See, e.g., TIM BOTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL
RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 29-33 (2011)
(identifying private nonmarket regulatory regimes); Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up
Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30
YALE J. INT'L L. 125, 126-27 (2005) (showing how business entities participate in setting
standards that can become absorbed into formal law); David Zaring, Informal Procedure,
Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 547, 548-50 (2005)
(describing the entrenchment of international regulatory standardization through
bureaucratic cooperation).
24. See Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 161, 161 n.2 (2002) ("Reflecting
the rise of non-state actors, the academic and policy literature on NGOs has itself
exploded.").
25. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, "Accountability" as "Legitimacy"- Global Governance, Global
Civil Society and the United Nations, 36 BROOK.J. INT'L L. 841, 846, 890 (2011) (arguing that
NGOs serve as their own gatekeepers and their "legitimacy" in the international system
is an empty form of auto-legitimation); Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of
International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 358 (2000) (noting that while
"[p]articipation by non-State actors in the international system greatly enhances [the]
accountability" of the international legal system, it can also be difficult for donors and
"those affected by the NGOs to hold them accountable").
26. For an overview of the literature, see Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations
and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 365-66 (2006). See also Spiro, supra note 24,
at 162 ("[TIhe accountability challenge may be better answered by formally and fully
recognizing NGO power in international institutional architectures."); infra Part I.A.
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international officials share this assessment: U.N. Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali called NGO activity a "basic form of popular representation in
the present-day world" and "a guarantee of . .. political legitimacy."27 Later,
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan praised the rise of NGO consultants as a
"revolution" and a "global people-power."28 Finally, in a 2004 report on the
consultancy program, U.N. officials continued to champion participation by
civil society, asserting that "[t]he growing participation and influence of non-
State actors is enhancing democracy and reshaping multilateralism."29
As this Article shows, the "people" advancing this global "revolution" are
often corporations. And many of these "democratizing" NGOs are associations
of business entities. Do they too proceed from moral authority and enhance the
legitimacy of the international legal process? I argue that, in fact, sometimes
business input can enhance procedural legitimacy and improve substantive
outcomes. But legal reforms are needed to capture these benefits and guard
against the harms business influence can cause. I offer a set of principles to
guide these reforms in order to better regulate business contributions and more
appropriately suit twenty-first-century relationships between international
officials, public interest NGOs, and business actors.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I begins by identifying the
Council's consultancy law and exploring its perplexing application to business
entities. Part II documents the astroturf activism phenomenon through an
original study and a taxonomy, cataloging the results as problems of opacity,
mission accountability, gatekeeping, and access. Part III constructs a critical
analysis-rooted in a historical account but also drawing on functionalism and
pluralistic theory-and develops a set of principles to guide legal reform.
I. A Regime of Consultants
The astroturf activism phenomenon in international law and governance
is a product of the international legal rules that offer a special consultancy
status to nonprofit entities but exclude businesses. This Part first frames the
27. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Sec'y-Gen., United Nations, Keynote Address to the 47th
DPI/NGO Conference: We the Peoples: Building Peace (Sept. 20,1994), in 47TH ANNUAL
DPI/NGO CONFERENCE FINAL REPORT 3, 3 (1994).
28. Press Release, Sec'y-Gen., Partnership with Civil Society Necessity in Addressing
Global Agenda, Says Secretary-General in Wellington, New Zealand Remarks, U.N.
Press Release SG/SM/7318 (Feb. 29, 2000).
29. Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations, We the Peoples:
Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance, in letter dated June 7, 2004
from the Chair of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society
Relations addressed to the Secretary-General, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/58/817 (June 11, 2004)
[hereinafter Cardoso Report].
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discussion by offering a vivid case study in astroturfing, then identifies the
relevant legal rules and describes their operation.
A. Who Makes International Law?
During the course of the infamous mass tort litigation in the United States
against Philip Morris and other tobacco companies, litigators accomplished a
major strategic coup d'6tat through the simple act of discovery. 30 The tobacco
companies were forced to produce thousands of documents that drew the
curtain on a vast and insidious array of strategies the companies used to resist
tobacco control.31
Among the buried secrets was evidence that the industry had not confined
itself to efforts to influence domestic regulation-rather, it had also launched an
"elaborate, well financed, sophisticated, and usually invisible" campaign of
deliberate subversion of international lawmaking institutions.32 The campaign
was focused most intensely on the WHO,33 as the tobacco companies sought to
shape that organization's agenda. The revelation of these tactics came at a time
when the WHO was in the midst of developing a major international treaty
targeted at regulating the tobacco industry: the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (Tobacco Convention).34 As a committee of experts who
reviewed the tobacco industry documents concluded, "[t]hat tobacco companies
resist proposals for tobacco control comes as no surprise, but what is now
visible is the scale, intensity and, importantly, the tactics, of their campaigns." 35
The scale and intensity of the tobacco companies' campaign, however, was
shrouded in secrecy. Most of their efforts to influence international lawmakers
were covert. Their tactics included hiring former WHO officials to gain
valuable contacts within the organization,3 6 secretly "pitting other U.N.
agencies against WHO,"3 7 manipulating the scientific and public health debate
30. COMM. OF EXPERTS ON TOBACCO INDUS. DOCUMENTS, WORLD HEALTH ORG., TOBACCO
COMPANY STRATEGIES TO UNDERMINE TOBACCO CONTROL ACTIVITIES AT THE WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION 25 (2000), http://www.who.int/tobacco/resources/
publications/general/who-inquiry/en [hereinafter TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES
REPORT].
31. See id. at 25, 30.
32. Id. at iii.
33. Id. ("The tobacco companies' own documents show that they viewed WHO, an
international public health agency, as one of their foremost enemies ... [and] instigated
global strategies to discredit and impede WHO's ability to carry out its mission.").
34. Id. at 80 (warning that the tobacco industry would likely mobilize to oppose the
Tobacco Convention).
35. Id. at 228.
36. Id. at 2, 37.
37. Id. at 1.
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about the health effects of tobacco through funding purportedly "independent"
experts,38 speaking through developing countries by convincing them that the
WHO's tobacco control program was a "First World" agenda unworthy of
their attention and support, 39 and conducting secret surveillance of WHO
activities.40
This battery of covert activities reveals the technique this Article calls
"astroturf activism": the tobacco companies "hid behind a variety of ostensibly
independent quasi-academic, public policy, and business organizations whose
tobacco industry funding was not disclosed." 41 In particular, these included
tobacco company-created front groups and trade unions that had obtained
consultative status at the WHO.42 These groups used their consultant status to
lobby against tobacco control activities generally and more specifically against
the treaty aimed at responding to the globalization of the "tobacco epidemic"43:
the Tobacco Convention.44 It is impossible to fully measure the results of the
tobacco companies' campaign against the WHO and Tobacco Convention 45 -
and the Tobacco Convention was ultimately successful against these odds.46
But the tobacco industry activities did succeed in "slow[ing] and undermin[ing]"
the WHO's tobacco control campaign and therefore effective tobacco
regulation around the world.47
38. Id. at 3, 50.
39. Id. at 1, 23,30, 86.
40. Id. at 53.
41. Id. at iii.
42. See, e.g., id. at 7 ("[T]obacco companies made prominent use of the International Tobacco
Growers' Association (ITGA) . . . [which] claims to represent the interests of local
farmers. The documents indicate, however, that tobacco companies have funded the
organization and directed its work."); see also infra note 263 and accompanying text.
43. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Foreword, opened for signature
May 21, 2003, 2302 U.N.T.S 166, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42811/l/
9241591013.pdfua=1 [hereinafter Tobacco Convention].
44. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at 6, 80. Incidentally, the
Tobacco Convention was the first treaty negotiated under WHO auspices. Tobacco
Convention, supra note 43, at Foreword.
45. The report of the Committee of Experts was released during the preparation and prior
to the conclusion of the Tobacco Convention. However, the experts concluded that the
tobacco industry would likely continue its "sophisticated and sustained" campaign to
"attempt to defeat" the Tobacco Convention or "to transform the proposal into a
vehicle for weakening national tobacco control initiatives." TOBACCO COMPANY
STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at 18-19.
46. See About the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/fctc/about/en (last visited Jan. 1, 2017) (noting that the WHO
Tobacco Convention entered into force on February 27, 2005 and "has since become
one of the most rapidly and widely embraced treaties in United Nations history").
47. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIEs REPORT, supra note 30, at iii. As one example, the
documents disclose that Phillip Morris took credit for a decision by the WHO to "drop
footnote continued on next page
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Business entities influence international lawmaking. The tobacco industry
example demonstrates the proposition in an unfortunately nefarious manner.
Not all examples of business influence put business at odds with international
regulators. 48 But the nature and extent of business influence remains
underappreciated and underexamined. 49
By contrast, a voluminous literature considers business influence on
informal or "bottom-up" lawmaking-that is, business roles in setting codes of
conduct and private standards, contributing to "soft" or voluntary internation-
al law or international regulation, and engaging in investor-state arbitration
that imports content into investment treaty regimes.50 That literature
tar and nicotine reductions" from a policy agenda. Id. at 64; see also id. at iii (arguing that
"[a]lthough the number of lives damaged or lost as a result of the tobacco companies'
subversion of WHO may never be quantified," on "the basis of the volume of attempted
and successful acts of subversion identified . . . it is reasonable to believe that the
tobacco companies' subversion of WHO's tobacco control activities has resulted in
significant harm").
48. See Durkee, supra note 6, at 295-97 (examining diverse and important business
contributions to a successful private law treaty, the Cape Town Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment).
49. See id. at 266-67, 288-91; see also Stephan, supra note 6, at 1577 (urging attention to the
role of private actors in international lawmaking). While the international legal
literature has far to go in this area, Braithwaite and Drahos have made a substantial
contribution in sociology. See generally BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 27-33
(detailing a major study's findings: that large corporations are effective actors in
"enrolling the power of states and the power of the most potent international
organizations" to shape global regulations). For a discussion of the literature on
business influence in the environmental context, see note 64 below.
50. See, e.g., BOTHE & MATTLI, supra note 23, at 29-33 (describing private standardization
regimes); VIRGINIA HAUFLER, A PUBLIC ROLE FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR: INDUSTRY SELF-
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 1-5 (2001) (exploring the phenomenon of industry
self-regulation in codes of conduct and coordinated standards); Kenneth W. Abbott &
Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New
Governance. Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 513
(2009) (describing transnational regulation as the product of a "[g]overnance [t]riangle"
between states, firms, and NGOs (bolding omitted)); Julian Arato, Corporations as
Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT'L L.J. 229, 232-33 (2015) (showing that business entities engage
in arbitration that defines the terms of bilateral investment treaties); Dan Danielsen,
How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously in Transnational Regulation
and Governance, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 412 (2005) (identifying private businesses'
various roles in global governance); Levit, supra note 23, at 126 (identifying "[blottom-
up lawmaking" as the idea that "practitioners-both public and private- . . . create,
interpret, and enforce their rules" and arguing that "[o]ver time, these initially informal
rules blossom into law that is just as real and just as effective, if not more effective,
as . . . treaties"); Andreas Georg Scherer & Guido Palazzo, The New Political Role of
Business in a Globalized World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and Its Implications
for the Firm, Governance, and Democracy, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 899, 911 (2011) ("Business
firms engage in processes of self-regulation through 'soft law' in instances where state
agencies are unable or unwilling to regulate."); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in
International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 56-58
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principally identifies, in Gregory Shaffer's terms, the ways that businesses
construct "private legal systems ... and private institutions to enforce" them 51
and examines the way that those private systems sometimes make their way
into formal law.52
Less has been said in the legal literature about direct business influence on
international lawmakers and, in turn, on formal international treaty law.53 In a
previous article, I offered case studies to show that businesses can be deeply
involved at all points in the treaty production process and that this has
significant implications for the health of international treaty regimes.54 The
article also observed that, at least in the private law context, business input can
at times improve the treaty production process by offering expertise,
proposing politically neutral solutions acceptable to differently situated states,
moving the process expeditiously forward, assisting with implementation, and
monitoring compliance.5 5 That work began to respond to the call for more
sustained analysis of business influence on formal international lawmaking.
But it also revealed important gaps in the legal literature in this area. In sum,
while corporate pressure on lawmakers has long been a topic of interest within
U.S. domestic legal literature, there is a striking lacuna in this area in
international legal literature. 56
(2014) (describing the mechanism whereby the WTO Agreement on the Application of
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures incorporates international standards).
51. Shaffer, supra note 6, at 151-52 (organizing business impact on lawmaking into two
broad categories: creating private law and influencing public lawmakers).
52. See sources cited supra note 50.
53. See Danielsen, supra note 50, at 411 (noting that "scholars have focused little attention
on ... the precise mechanisms through which corporations contribute to transnational
regulation and governance" or the welfare effects of those corporate contributions);
Shaffer, supra note 6, at 175-76 (collecting literature); Stephan, supra note 6, at 1577
(proposing this as a fertile area of research).
54. See Durkee, supra note 6, at 291-305 (offering case studies on the Cape Town
Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and the Convention on
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, which is
also known as the Rotterdam Rules).
55. See id. at 294-97.
56. This is not to say that the literature on interest group impacts on lawmakers is wholly
absent. To the contrary, understanding the effect of domestic politics on the develop-
ment of international law is one of the central projects of liberal theory in internation-
al scholarship. See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle An Integrated Theory
of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 469, 470-83 (2005) (identifying core aims of legal
theory and examining how international legal theory borrows from international
relations); see also Moravcsik, supra note 16, at 518-20 (arguing that domestic constitu-
encies construct state interests). Moreover, the attention by liberal theorists to interest
group influence on international law has inspired a broader literature. See, e.g.,
Benvenisti, supra note 16, at 168-70 (casting the sovereign state as an agent of small
interest groups); Brewster, supra note 16, at 502 (arguing that domestic interest groups
try to influence international law in order to set domestic policy); Koh, supra note 16,
footnote continued on next page
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The gap is demonstrated by a notable contrast: a "copious" literature
examines the contributions and influences of NGOs on international
lawmaking.57 Dozens of law review articles consider the NGO role in
consulting with and influencing international lawmakers, through formal
consultancy regimes and otherwise. 58 The literature addresses, among other
questions, the legal status of NGOs,5 9 the impact of NGOs on the lawmaking
process, 60 the legitimacy of NGO participation as consultants to international
lawmakers,6 1 and whether NGOs might have a right to consult with
international lawmakers.62 But this literature focuses its attention on classic
public interest NGOs and not on business-promoting NGOs, such as industry
or trade associations, or on business influence on public interest NGOs. 63 In
at 2656 (identifying a process-based theory that views substate officials and interest
groups as involved in a process of law development, reception, and integration). But
liberal theory and its progeny do little to explain how this interest group activity
affects the ultimate success or failure of international treaties, nor do they isolate the
role of business actors in lawmaking or study the effect of those business roles on
international law. See Hathaway, supra note 16, at 1954-55 (noting some limitations of
liberal theory).
57. Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 349-50.
58. See Spiro, supra note 24, at 161 n.2 ("[T]he academic and policy literature on NGOs
has ... exploded."). For a relatively pithy overview of the NGO literature, see Char-
novitz, supra note 26, at 365-66, which identifies literatures related to the identity,
functions, and legal status of NGOs, as well as the legitimacy and effects of NGO
activity on the international stage. For an early annotated bibliography, see Yahya A.
Dehqanzada, Annotated Bibliography, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL
CIVIL SOCIETY 241, 241-76 (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000). Despite the wealth of literature,
Spiro points out that the role of NGOs in international lawmaking "remains under-
theorized." Peter J. Spiro, NGOs and Human Rightr Channels of Power, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 115, 115 (Sarah Joseph & Adam
McBeth eds., 2010).
59. See, e.g., Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-
Governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579,
580 (1999) ("This Article analyzes the legal consequences of the changing international
system for the legal status of NGOs under international law.").
60. See, e.g., Jost E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS As LAW-MAKERS 611 (2005)
("[N]o one questions today the fact that international law-both its content and its
impact-has been forever changed by the empowerment of NGOs.").
61. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 25, at 846, 890 (arguing that NGOs serve as their own
gatekeepers and their "legitimacy" in the international system is an empty form of
auto-legitimation); Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs?: Human Rights
Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
261, 264-65 (2004) (arguing that NGO access is insufficiently regulated).
62. See generally Steve Charnovitz, The Illegitimacy of Preventing NGO Participation, 36
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 891, 909 (2011) (suggesting that "state practice is moving toward a
duty to consult NGOs in the activities of' international organizations).
63. Many commentators "reserve the term 'NGO' for organizations that pursue a 'public
interest,"' rather than a profit motive. Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 350 n.12. Some do
note that the term NGO can include organizations promoting profit-seeking business-
footnote continued on next page
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doing so, this literature has not attended to the astroturf activism phenomenon
this Article identifies. It does not focus on the ways that business influence is
channeled through the consultancy system both overtly and covertly, nor does
it analyze the implications of this phenomenon on the success or failure of
international treaties.64
es. See, e.g., id. at 350 (defining NGOs as "not profit seeking" but noting that "associations
of business entities can be" NGOs (emphasis added)). But even those who include
associations of businesses within their definition of NGO appear to have in mind
public interest NGOs rather than, for example, industry associations. Steve Charnovitz
himself argues that "[i]ndividuals join ... an NGO out of commitment to its purpose"
and thus give NGOs their "moral authority." Id. at 348. Notably, while a subcurrent in
the literature expresses concern that NGOs are insufficiently regulated, many celebrate
NGO activity as enhancing the moral authority, representativeness, and democratic
accountability of the international system. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying
text.
64. There is a separate literature that highlights and critically examines the role of
business-oriented NGOs in the context of environmental treaties. See, e.g., Chiara
Giorgetti, From Rio to Kyoto: A Study of the Involvement of Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions in the Negotiations on Climate Change, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 220 (1999) (noting
that business NGOs were active lobbyists at a number of different climate change
treaty negotiations). This literature responds in part to the fact that some environmen-
tal treaties have different consultancy regimes than the one under consideration in this
Article. See infra Part I.B.1 (examining the consultancy regime developed by the
Council pursuant to Article 71 of the U.N. Charter and other regimes that follow the
same format). For example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) has developed a set of accreditation rules that "differentiates
between research and independent NGOs ('RINGOs'), business and industry NGOs
('BINGOs'), environmental NGOs ('ENGOs'), local NGOs, indigenous peoples organiza-
tions ('IPOs'), local government and municipal authorities ('LGMAs'), islanders, trade
unions, and faith-based groups." Stephen Tully, Commercial Contributions to the Climate
Change Regime. Who's Regulating Whom?, SUSTAINABLE DEv. L. & POL'Y, Spring 2005, at
14, 16. Thus, in the environmental treaty literature, "BINGO" is a familiar term. See, e.g.,
Asher Alkoby, Global Networks and International Environmental Lawmaking: A Discourse
Approach, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 377, 378 (2008) (using the term "BINGO" to refer to "business
and industry nongovernmental organizations"); Giorgetti, supra, at 220 (using the term
"BNGO" to mean "interest groups that unite several companies to campaign for a
specific point of view"); Monica Brookman, Book Note, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 369,
374-75 (2000) (reviewing ANITA MARGRETHE HALVORSSEN, EQUALITY AMONG
UNEQUALS IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1999)) (referring to "business
NGOs" as "large, influential lobbying groups" sometimes "represent[ing] commercial
interests that are not always compatible with environmental protection"). While this
environmental treaty literature recognizes the descriptive fact that businesses act
through NGOs to influence international lawmakers (and sometimes offers a
normative response), it does not focus on the critique developed in this Article: that
forcing businesses to act through NGOs rather than independently creates perverse
results. See, e.g., Joelle de S6pibus & Kateryna Holzer, The UNFCCC at a Crossroads Can
Increased Involvement of Business and Industry Help Rescue the Multilateral Climate Regime?,
8 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 23, 24 (2014) (urging increased business participation
within the current UNFCCC consultancy structure). In fact, the critique and reforms
developed in this Article may have equal force in the UNFCCC context, but that
analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
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As the Tobacco Convention saga suggests, international treaties are under
pressure.65 The popular press and academic literature alike observe that
international treaty production faces an array of challenges, including global
power imbalances, geopolitical logjams, and domestic legal and political
pressures that can obstruct the production of a treaty altogether or eviscerate
the effect of any treaty that is ultimately concluded.66 However, although
treaties are under pressure, they remain indispensable legal tools.67 They erect
the fundamental architecture of international governance-creating
institutions and courts, setting the ground rules for informal cooperation and
governance, and serving as the foundation upon which modern global
regulatory life depends.6 8 And treaties remain fundamentally important to
solving important global problems like climate change. 69 Thus, in order to
achieve better solutions to pressing global problems, legal doctrine and
scholarship must address defects in treaty law.
One important defect in treaty law is the lack of a specific regulatory
response to business influence.70 And developing that regulatory response
65. Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance A Case of
the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT'L L. 491, 497 & nn.13-14, 498 & nn.15-17 (2012) (identifying why
treaties are ineffective at coordinating global financial regulations and collecting
literature on multilateral treaty failures).
66. The domestic problem was on startling display in the United States recently as the
Supreme Court granted a preliminary injunction halting the Obama Administration's
regulation of coal power plants to comply with the Paris Agreement-a major
international agreement to combat climate change hailed as a great success just months
earlier. See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.) (granting a preliminary
injunction halting the Environmental Protection Agency's enforcement of President
Obama's Clean Power Plan while litigation over the plan is pending in the D.C.
Circuit). The Supreme Court's decision (albeit preliminary) put not just United States
compliance into question but also that of India and China-the world's two largest
polluters-who may retract their commitments if the United States fails to uphold its
own. Coral Davenport, Supreme Court's Blow to Emissions Efforts May Imperil Paris
Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2016), http://nyti.ms/1V473CK ("If the U.S.
Supreme Court actually declares the coal power plant rules stillborn, the chances of
nurturing trust between countries would all but vanish . . . . This could be the
proverbial string which causes Paris to unravel." (quoting Navroz K. Dubash, Senior
Fellow, Ctr. for Policy Research)). Thus, in one stroke of the Supreme Court's pen, a
major and important international agreement faces implosion. For critiques in the
academic literature, see, for example, Abbott & Snidal, supra note 50, at 510, which
criticizes the "persistent regulatory inadequacies" of treaty-based governance.
67. See Melissa J. Durkee, Persuasion Treaties, 99 VA. L. REv. 63, 74 nn.44-48, 75 nn.49-52, 76
nn.53-57, 77 nn.58-61 (2013) (collecting literature).
68. Id.; see also Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM.J. INT'L L.
581, 614 (2005) ("[E]ven a networked world will require explicit agreements.").
69. Durkee, supra note 67, at 74-75 (citing Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International
Environmental Law, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 259, 282-83 (1992)).
70. See Durkee, supra note 6, at 268 (arguing that international law has not developed
adequate tools to regulate business influence on lawmaking); see also BRAITHWAITE &
footnote continued on next page
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requires understanding the phenomenon to be regulated. This Article
undertakes a foundational element of that task by narrowing in on a specific
and important locus of business influence: the legal structure that gives rise to
astroturf activism. For the purpose of this analysis, "astroturf activism" is the
overt and covert use by business of the consultancy system at international
institutions such as the Council and the WHO to influence international
lawmaking, as subsequent Parts explain.
An exposure and systematic analysis of the astroturf activism phenome-
non is long overdue. Over a decade ago, the committee of experts that
considered the tobacco industry disclosures detailed above recommended that
lawyers and policymakers rethink the relationships between the tobacco
industry, NGOs, and lawmakers and find new means to expose the covert
relationships between them.71 That work has yet to be done. Indeed, those
experts recommended finding a way to disclose the identities and affiliations of
all nonstate actors that attempt to influence the production of international
law.72 That mission, vitally important to the health of modern multilateral
treaty regimes, begins in the pages that follow.
B. The Consultancy Structure
The first step in the mission the committee of experts identified is to
clearly identify the legal structure that gives rise to the astroturf activism
phenomenon. In other words, what is this consultancy structure that permits
special access to international lawmakers?
1. NGOs press for access to the United Nations
The story begins at the drafting of the U.N. Charter in San Francisco at the
conclusion of World War II. Twelve hundred NGOs were present in San
Francisco at the time, some serving as part of the U.S. delegation to the
Conference on International Organization, which would bring the United
Nations to life.73 One of the agendas the NGOs were pursuing was obtaining
some sort of status for themselves within the new organization. 74 NGOs had
DRAHOS, supra note 1, at 10-14 (using tools from sociology, macroeconomics, and
psychology to examine unregulated business influence on domestic and international
lawmakers).
71. In fact, the Tobacco Report was published in 2000. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES
REPORT, supra note 30.
72. Id. at 9, 19, 104.
73. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18
MICH.J. INT'L L. 183, 250-51 (1997).
74. See id. at 251 (reporting that NGO consultants sought "a provision on NGOs in the U.N.
Charter," an idea that had not been previously considered by state delegates).
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been active in the earlier League of Nations and sought to preserve their access
in the new United Nations.7 5 They were ultimately successful in these aims, as
the U.N. Charter included Article 7176: "The Economic and Social Council may
make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental
organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such
arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where
appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member
of the United Nations concerned."7 7
Since Article 71 includes the only mention of associations in the U.N.
Charter, the provision "has served de facto as a charter for NGO activities."78
This de facto charter both facilitates and restrains the opportunities for
associations to take roles within the United Nations. It means that the only
officially recognized way that an NGO can participate in the work of the
United Nations is through the consultation arrangements the Council is
empowered to make.79 The U.N. Charter does not, for example, contain any
provision allowing nonstate associations to have voting privileges,
membership on delegations to treaty-drafting conventions, or any other kind
of rights. Notably, for the purposes of this analysis, the Charter also does not
make any particular mention of access rights for business entities.80
Article 71 is situated among the provisions of the U.N. Charter that
constitute the Council, which is the organ of the United Nations charged with
overseeing U.N. programs on "economic, social, cultural, educational, health,
and related matters."81 The Council also sets up commissions concerning the
75. Id.; see also id. at 258 (explaining that Article 71 served to "codify the custom of NGO
participation" that had existed in the League of Nations period prior to World War II).
76. See id. at 250-51, 257 (describing how NGOs assisted in drafting Article 71).
77. U.N. Charter art. 71.
78. Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 357.
79. See Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 250 ("Not everyone viewed Article 71 as a step forward
for NGOs. . . . [Some] viewed Article 71 as 'a so-far-and-no-further obstacle to any
continuance of the pragmatic but close ... partnership [between NGOs and interna-
tional organizations] developed under the League."' (quoting BERTRAM PICKARD, THE
GREATER UNITED NATIONS: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE PLACE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 72 (1956))).
80. The text of the charter could be read to include individual business "organizations," as
businesses are, after all, the result of individuals organizing to accomplish a common
purpose, with the only distinguishing feature being profit motive. Franklin G. Snyder
has made a similar point, albeit outside of the U.N. Charter context. See Franklin G.
Snyder, Sharing Sovereignty: Non-State Associations and the Limits of State Power, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 365, 378 (2004) (noting that business enterprises are "voluntary associations" just
as NGOs are). However, this interpretation is likely not what the drafters intended. As
Steve Charnovitz has noted, "[t]he practice of excluding commercial organizations
from the category of 'associations' goes back at least to ... 1910." Charnovitz, supra note
73, at 187 n.17.
81. U.N. Charter art. 62, ¶ 1.
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economic, social, and other issues within its mandate. 82 And, under the
authority of Article 71, the Council has become the body charged with
supervising and managing NGO access to the U.N. system. 83
2. The Council sets access regulations
The Council has exercised its Article 71 authority and made "arrangements
for consultation with non-governmental organizations" by developing rules to
govern an accreditation procedure.84 Those rules define an NGO as "[a]ny
international organization which is not established by intergovernmental
agreement."8 5 The definition reflects the Council's principal concern at the
time, which was to draw a distinction between international intergovernmental
organizations (such as the United Nations itself) on the one hand and
nongovernmental associations (such as Greenpeace) on the other.86 The Council
was not trying to distinguish between different kinds of nongovernmental
associations.87
In the Council's conception, consultative status serves dual purposes: to
assist the United Nations in gathering relevant expertise from nongovernmen-
tal sources and to give members of civil society the opportunity to have access
to governance functions and express their opinions.88 To that end, in 1996 the
82. Id. art. 68.
83. Ferdinand Trauttmansdorff, The Organs of the United Nations, in THE UNITED NATIONS:
LAW AND PRACTICE 25,41 (Franz Cede & Lilly Sucharipa-Behrmann eds., 2001).
84. U.N. Charter art. 71. The Council has passed various resolutions to govern NGO access
to the United Nations pursuant to Article 71, including Resolution 4(I), Economic and
Social Council Res. 4(I) (Feb. 14, 1946); Resolution 288(X)(B), which codified privileges
and practices relating to NGOs that had developed between 1946 and 1950, Economic
and Social Council Res. 288(X)(B) (Feb. 27, 1950); Resolution 1296 (XLIV), Economic
and Social Council Res. 1296 (XLIV) (May 23, 1968); and, finally, Resolution 1996/31,
which offered an updated set of rules that remain in effect as of this writing, Economic
and Social Council Res. 1996/31 (July 25, 1996). For narrative descriptions of the
functions of these resolutions, see Stephan Hobe, Article 71, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1788,1797 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); and
Rainer Lagoni, Article 71, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY
902,904-05 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1995).
85. E.S.C. Res. 1296 (XLIV), supra note 84, T 7.
86. See Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 252-53.
87. The definition did exclude national organizations on the theory that those national
organizations could present their views to their own national governments. Id. at 253.
The original rules provided for two tiers of access for NGOs (Category A and Category
B) depending on the breadth of the NGO mission. See id. Of particular relevance to this
Article's analysis, "[a]mong the earliest Category A organizations admitted were the
World Federation of Trade Unions" and the International Chamber of Commerce. Id.
88. See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 20 ("[Clonsultative arrangements are to be made,
on the one hand, for the purpose of enabling the Council or one of its bodies to secure
expert information or advice from organizations ... and, on the other hand, to enable
footnote continued on next page
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Council updated its eligibility criteria for associations with rules that remain in
force today.89 The new criteria were intended to respond to a rise in the
prominence of NGOs in the early 1990s and a perception that the earlier
eligibility rules were too restrictive.90 In addition, with an increased global
understanding of governance disparities between the developed and
developing worlds, the new rules were meant to ensure "a just, balanced,
effective and genuine involvement of non-governmental organizations from
all regions and areas of the world."91 In particular, the Council sought (1) an
increased representation of associations from developing countries and (2) to
ensure that accredited associations would be accountable representatives of the
interests of their constituencies.92 The eligibility criteria were meant to assist
the Council in achieving these objectives.
The criteria required, first, that an association seeking consultative status
have "aims and purposes" that support "the spirit, purposes and principles" of
the United Nations and promote that body's work.93 In addition, an association
must be "of recognized standing within the particular field of its competence or
of a representative character." 94 It must be able to establish the accountability
and representativeness of its internal governance mechanisms through indicia
such as "an established headquarters,"95 "a democratically adopted constitution"
providing for a representative process to set policy,96 a responsive "executive
organ,"97 and documented "authority to speak for its members through its
international, regional, subregional and national organizations that represent
important elements of public opinion to express their views.").
89. See id.
90. Id. 1 5; see also Hobe, supra note 84, at 1800 (observing that the prior rules were
perceived as too restrictive in their "narrow criteria for inclusion, the requirement of
internationality, and the veto granted to States toward granting consultative status to
NGOs from their own countries").
91. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 5; see also Lagoni, supra note 84, at 912 (noting that
"issues ... unresolved" in 1995 included "the unequal representation under Art. 71 of
non-governmental organizations from different regions of the world" and, in
particular, the overrepresentation of organizations from Western industrialized
countries). Resolution 1996/31 was passed to implement these reforms after a three-
year period of review. Hobe, supra note 84, at 1801.
92. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶¶ 1-17. The Council also eliminated the earlier
distinction between international and national organizations but required that
national organizations consult with the member state concerned prior to obtaining
accreditation. Id. It 5, 8.
93. Id. It 2, 3.
94. Id. ¶ 9.
95. Id. 1 10.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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authorized representatives."98 Finally, organizations must be nonprofits and
obtain most of their funding from "national affiliate[] [organizations] . . . or
from individual members."99
In addition to establishing admission criteria for would-be U.N. consult-
ants, the Council updated its gatekeeping mechanism. Specifically, it updated
the rules governing the work of the Committee on Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGO Committee),'00 whose members it elects.101 The NGO
Committee has jurisdiction over the accreditation application process.1 02 It
receives applications from prospective NGO consultants and meets twice a
year to vote on whether to grant accreditation to pending applicants. 03
Neither the Council nor the NGO Committee, however, independently verifies
whether the organizations comply with the accreditation criteria.1 04 Rather,
they rely on representations made by the organizations themselves in their
application materials.1 05
Organizations that successfully gain admission to the consultancy regime
are organized into three tiers, which relate to the scope of the NGO's activities
and the degree of assistance it might offer the United Nations as a consult-
ant.106 "General" status is reserved for organizations that are the most global in
footprint and pursue the broadest missions: they "are concerned with most of
[the Council's] activities," can "demonstrate ... sustained contributions ... to the
98. Id. ¶ 11. Resolution 1996/31 also includes a repetitive catchall provision: the
organization must possess "a representative structure and ... appropriate mechanisms
of accountability to its members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies
and actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and
transparent decision-making processes." Id. ¶ 12.
99. Id. ¶ 13. There is a loophole: when an organization is financed from other sources, it
must explain to the satisfaction of the Council (via its NGO Committee) the organiza-
tion's reasons for not meeting these requirements. Id.
100. Id. ¶ 60; see also Jeffrey Andrew Hartwick, Non-Governmental Organizations at United
Nations-Sponsored World Conferencev A Framework for Participation Reform, 26 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 217,223 (2003) (describing the functions of the NGO Committee).
101. Members of the committee are delegates from U.N. member states, selected "on the
basis of equitable geographical representation." E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, 160.
102. Hartwick, supra note 100, at 223.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 224 & n.45 (stating that applications are first screened by the Council's
Department of Economic and Social Affairs and then sent to the NGO Committee,
where "[v]oting rights and democratic accountability are determined by an examina-
tion of an NGO's submitted constitution or by-laws" and financial status is determined
by financial statements the organizations submit but noting that "[t]he UN does not
actually verify" the information contained in these documents).
105. See id.
106. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, It 21-26; see also STEPHEN TULLY, CORPORATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 66 (2007) (reviewing the tiered consultation structure);
Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 267 (reviewing the tiers).
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achievement of [U.N.] objectives," and are "broadly representative of major
segments of society in a large number of countries."107 Greenpeace and
M6decins Sans Frontibres (Doctors Without Borders), for example, have
obtained General consultative status.108 "Special" status is for organizations
that are concerned with "a few of the fields of activity" the Council pursues,
such as Human Rights Watch and the American Bar Association. 109 Finally,
"Roster" status falls short of full consultancy status and is granted to NGOs that
do not qualify for the other two categories but may make "occasional and
useful contributions" to the United Nations' work.11 0 Among these are the
Sierra Club and Heifer Project International.1" As of this Article's writing,
over 4600 organizations have taken advantage of consultancy status. 112
3. Consultants have access to lawmakers
Let us turn to the access opportunities consultants gain through the
consultancy. There are three principal points of access: to the Council itself and
its commissions' subsidiary bodies, to the broader United Nations, and-
perhaps most importantly for the purposes of influencing formal international
lawmaking-to international conferences convened by the United Nations.
First, access opportunities within the Council are keyed to the consultant's
tier, with the most rights afforded to General consultants.11 3 Consultants may
107. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 22; see also Kal Raustiala, NGOs in International
Treaty-Making, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 150,156 n.24 (Duncan B. Hollis ed.,
2012) (noting that NGOs with general status "tend to be fairly large, established
international NGOs with a broad geographical reach").
108. Consultative Status with ECOSOC and Other Accreditations, NGO BRANCH: DEP'T ECON. &
Soc. AFF., http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayConsultativeStatusSearch.do?
method=search&sessionCheck=false (to locate, search "Greenpeace" in "Organization's
Name" search bar) (last visited Jan. 1, 2017); id. (to locate, search "Medecins Sans
Frontieres" in "Organization's Name" search bar).
109. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 23; Consultative Status with ECOSOC and Other
Accreditations, supra note 108 (to locate, search "Human Rights Watch" in "Organiza-
tion's Name" search bar); id. (to locate, search "American Bar Association" in "Organiza-
tion's Name" search bar); see also Raustiala, supra note 107, at 157 n.24 (stating that
NGOs with Special consultative status "tend to be smaller and more recently estab-
lished").
110. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 24; see also Raustiala, supra note 107, at 157 n.24
("Organizations that apply for consultative status but do not fit in any of the other
categories are usually included in the Roster. These NGOs tend to have a rather narrow
and/or technical focus.").
111. Consultative Status with ECOSOC and Other Accreditations, supra note 108 (to locate, search
"Sierra Club" in "Organization's Name" search bar); id. (to locate, search "Heifer Project
International" in "Organization's Name" search bar).
112. Consultative Status with ECOSOC and Other Accreditations, supra note 108.
113. See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, pts. IV & V (enumerating access rights of General,
Special, and Roster consultants to the Council itself and to commissions and otherfootnote continued on next page
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send representatives to sit as observers at meetings of the Council and its
commissions and other subsidiary bodies, and they may present written and
sometimes oral comments to international officials in various contexts. 114
Those with General consultative status may even present their own agenda
items to officials in a number of contexts.115
Second, in addition to consulting with the Council and its subsidiary
bodies, consultative status gives organizations broader access within the
United Nations. Organizations may consult with the U.N. Secretariat "on
matters in which there is a mutual interest or a mutual concern" at the request
of either party.'16 They may be commissioned by the Secretary-General to
carry out studies or prepare papers on particular matters.117 They can access
press release services provided by the United Nations.1 18 And these
organizations may obtain general access with U.N. "grounds passes."119
Importantly, because consultative status offers consultants access to nonpublic
areas where governmental delegates and international organization officials
gather, the status confers plenty of "informal lobbying opportunities."1 20
Third, among the array of privileges afforded to consultants is presump-
tive access to U.N.-sponsored treatymaking conferences and the preparatory
processes leading up to those conferences-an important point of access for
consultants to influence the work of international lawmakers.121 Consultants
are automatically accredited to international conferences (and their
preparatory processes) simply by expressing their interest to the U.N.
subsidiary bodies of the Council). Roster organizations have slightly fewer rights. See
id. ¶¶ 29, 31(e), 31(f), 36, 37(f), 38(b) (providing that Roster organizations may have
representatives present only at meetings "concerned with matters within their field of
competence," may submit longer written statements to the Council only upon request
of the Council or NGO Committee, may only submit written statements to subsidiary
bodies upon invitation of the Secretary-General, and may only speak at meetings of the
commission or other subsidiary organs upon the recommendation of the Secretary-
,General and the request of the body in question).
114. Id. TT 29, 30, 32(a); see also Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 267 (reviewing rights for
General consultants).
115. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 28.
116. Id. 165.
117. Id. t 66.
118. Id. 167.
119. See Accreditation, UNITED NATIONS OFF. AT GENEVA, http://www.unog.ch/ngo/
accreditation (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
120. TULLY, supra note 106, at 66.
121. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, pt. VII; see also Paul Wapner, Defending Accountability
in NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 197, 203 (2002) (arguing that participation in U.N.-sponsored
treatymaking "has been essential for NGO influence on international treaties").
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Secretariat. No further screening is necessary. 122 This saves associations the
burden of applying separately to every conference and preparatory process
they wish to attend.123 Consultants, once admitted, do not have a negotiating
role but can participate in working groups, make written presentations, and
sometimes even engage in floor debates. 124 This is a key benefit of accreditation
and, as a result of this access right, U.N.-sponsored treaty negotiations or
conferences now regularly have "a sizeable, sometimes enormous, NGO
component." 125
4. The Council's rules as a blueprint
What is the significance of Article 71 and the Council's resulting accredita-
tion regime? Why study this accreditation regime as the focal point for NGOs'
access to the work of international lawmakers? Several answers have been
offered in the preceding paragraphs: the consultancy structure is the only point
of contact between nonstate associations and the United Nations that is
regularized in the U.N. Charter, and it offers formal and informal access to
U.N. officials and national lawmaking delegates at U.N. treaty conferences.
Consider an additional reason: the Council's consultancy structure has
spread far beyond the Council and served as a blueprint for many other
consultancy regimes at other international organizations. 126 These include
agencies within the U.N. system, such as the WHO and UNESCO, which have
adopted accreditation rules nearly identical to the Council's. 127 In fact, as the
122. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 42 (providing that organizations with consultative
status "shall as a rule be accredited" to participate at international conferences).
Accreditation is not guaranteed, but "those non-state actors already possessing
ECOSOC accreditation enjoy a legitimate expectation of admission." TULLY, supra note
106, at 206.
123. By contrast, associations that are not consultants must first apply for accreditation to
each individual conference before receiving admission as observers-requiring them to
"submit official documents outlining their mandate, scope and governing structure,
evidence their non-profit status, describe activities suggesting competence and provide
details of affiliations, funding sources, publications and designated contact points."
TULLY, supra note 106, at 205; see also E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶¶ 42-47.
124. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, TS 49-52.
125. Raustiala, supra note 107, at 156.
126. See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 358-59 ("Even though Article 71 refers only to
ECOSOC, a consultative role for NGOs gradually became an established practice
throughout the UN system."). See generally UNITED NATIONS NON-GOVERNMENTAL
LIAISON SERV., UN SYSTEM ENGAGEMENT WITH NGOs, CIVIL SOCIETY, THE PRIVATE
SECTOR, AND OTHER ACTORS: A COMPENDIUM (2005), https://www.unngls.org/pdfs/
compendium-2005-withCOVER.pdf (cataloging an array of accreditation regimes
throughout the U.N. system).
127. See Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 253-55 (noting that UNESCO, the WHO, and the
(unsuccessful) ITO are among the agencies mirroring the Article 71 consultation
footnote continued on next page
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United Nations launched its specialized agencies, it usually closely followed the
Article 71 model and the Council's implementing rules to define and structure
relationships with NGOs. 128
While a certain degree of heterogeneity remains among different accredi-
tation structures, 129 the Council's accreditation rules are a meaningful point of
entry.130 Outside the United Nations, the influence of the Article 71 Council
regime has spread to institutions as diverse as the Organization of American
States, the Antarctic Treaty, and the African Union.13 1 Thus, considering the
Council's regime as an exemplar will serve as a useful way to expose the
problem this Article considers, frame its critique, and model a potential
solution. And to the extent a reform will be effective for the Council's
consultancy structure, it will likely also serve as an effective blueprint for a
more diverse set of accreditation regimes.
C. The Rules Apply Oddly and Uneasily to Businesses
How do businesses fit within the consultancy rules? Quite simply, individ-
ual businesses are excluded. But the rules do not restrain businesses from
expressing themselves and attempting to wield influence through nonprofits
formed or used for such a purpose. Although I call this quasi-accommodation
an odd and uneasy treatment of business entities-a critique I will defend in
Parts II and III below-this structure would have seemed inevitable to the
drafters of Article 71 and the early Council rulemakers. This Subpart explains
the current legal structure and its origins.
model). Significantly, "Article 71 gave NGOs a hunting license to pursue involvement
in the U.N. beyond ECOSOC" and served to "codify the custom of NGO participation"
that had existed in the League of Nations period. Id. at 257-58.
128. See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 358-59. See generally UNITED NATIONS NON-
GOVERNMENTAL LIAISON SERV., supra note 126 (summarizing NGO accreditation
structures at diverse international organizations).
129. For an excellent analysis of the features and flaws of the consultation regime of the
United Nations Commission on Trade Law, as well as an account of efforts to reform
that consultation regime, see SUSAN BLOcK-LIEB & TERENCE HALLIDAY, GLOBAL
LAWMAKERS: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CRAFTING OF WORLD MARKETS
(forthcoming 2017) (ch. 8 manuscript at 2) (on file with author).
130. See Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 249 ("As U.N. specialized agencies were created, they
generally followed the Article 71 model.").
131. See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 359.
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1. The consultancy rules exclude individual businesses
Article 71 of the U.N. Charter employs the neutral term "non-
governmental organizations." 132 That term might at first glance seem to
accommodate for-profit entities just as well as other kinds of NGOs. After all,
business entities are created by individuals organizing to accomplish a common
purpose, just as other organizations are. The only distinguishing feature is that
business organizations have a profit motive. This is a point some commenta-
tors have made outside the Article 71 context: "Walt Disney Co., for example, is
as much a voluntary association as Amnesty International . . . ."133 But this
more capacious definition of association, or "organization[]," is likely not what
the Charter's drafters intended. As Steve Charnovitz has noted, "[the practice
of excluding commercial organizations from the category of 'associations' was
well established at the time the Charter was drafted.1 34
The Council's accreditation rules eliminated all doubt by making clear that
individual profit-seeking businesses are excluded.135 The criteria demand that
an accredited organization be a nonprofit and obtain its funding from "national
affiliate[] [organizations] ... or from individual members," a requirement that
excludes any associations organized for commercial or profit-making
purposes-namely, businesses. 136 In addition to this requirement, accredited
organizations must be organized for purposes in conformity with the "spirit,
purposes and principles" of the United Nations. 137 This is to say, in the
hypothetical world in which the nonprofit criterion did not bar entry,
businesses would also have to show that their "aims and purposes" support the
"spirit, purposes and principles" of the U.N. Charter.13 8 The Council's website
describes the groups anticipated by this criterion as "international, regional,
132. U.N. Charter art. 71; see also Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 187 n.17 ("The practice of
excluding commercial organizations from the category of 'associations' goes back at
least to ... 1910.").
133. Snyder, supra note 80, at 378.
134. Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 187 n.17.
135. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 13 ("The basic resources of the organization shall be
derived in the main from contributions of the national affiliates or other components
or from individual members."). The rules also require "a democratically adopted
constitution" and that an organization have "authority to speak for its members
through its authorized representatives." Id. It 10-11. Businesses may have an argument
that their corporate charter and shareholder voting structure satisfy these criteria, but
the rules are designed with other purposes in view, and the paragraph 13 nonprofit
requirement is dispositive.
136. Id. ¶ 13.
137. Id. ¶ 2. Other entities excluded by these criteria include governmental or
intergovernmental organizations, see id. ¶ 12, individuals, see id. ¶ 5, and secessionist or
other armed groups with governmental ambitions, see id. ¶4.
138. Id. ¶2.
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sub-regional, national non-governmental organizations, non-profit
organizations, public sector or voluntary organizations." 3 9
Other international organizations that follow the Article 71 accreditation
template, such as U.N. specialized agencies like the WHO, also exclude
individual businesses from their consultancy structures. For example, the
WHO's parallel to Article 71 "enables it to conclude suitable arrangements with
nonstate actors in the execution of its mandate"1 40 but specifies that it may not
form this official relationship with nonstate actors pursuing "concerns which
are primarily of a commercial or profit-making nature."1 41 Simply put,
businesses are not granted access to the consultation regime.
2. But they permit businesses to act through nonprofits
Although businesses are individually excluded, they are permitted to
consult through accredited nonprofits. A brief account of the origins of this
legal structure will frame the critique of its effects, which is to come in Parts II
and III.
The story begins even further back in time, in the League of Nations-era in
the 1920s and 1930s. Article 71-and, in turn, the Council's rule structure-was
designed to enshrine the earlier "League Method"1 42 whereby voluntary
associations and international organizations had very close working
relationships. 143 As one commentator noted, "[b]ehind many [early
international organizations] stood idealistic and active NGOs."144
139. Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status, supra note 20. The Council's brochure, which
explains consultative status to potential applicants, certainly affirms a general sense
that consultative status is meant for small, hardworking public interest groups: the
brochure is replete with photographs of a diverse array of people, some in native attire
and others in T-shirts emblazoned with activist slogans, nary a corporate suit to be
found. See UNITED NATIONS, WORKING WITH ECOSOC: AN NGOs GUIDE TO
CONSULTATIVE STATUS (2011), http://csonet.org/content/documents/Brochure.pdf.
140. TULLY, supra note 106, at 68.
141. World Health Org. [WHO], World Health Assembly Res. 40.25, ¶ 3.1 (Jan. 23, 1987), in
BASIC DOCUMENTS 97, 98 (48th ed. 2014), http://apps.who.int/gb/bd. Even the
UNFCCC-which includes the distinct category "BINGO" or "Business and Industry
NGO" as a particular type of constituency group within its larger pool of observer
organizations-explicitly requires that admitted organizations be nonprofit NGOs, not
individual business entities. See Tully, supra note 64, at 15-16.
142. Rainer Lagoni & Eleni Chaitidou, Article 71, in 2 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
A COMMENTARY 1068, 1070 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (explaining that
Article 71 was an attempt to codify the "usual practice" of the League of Nations).
143. See Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 245 (describing the League-era context in which
voluntary associations defined and presented issues for the League's consideration;
served as "insiders working directly with government officials and international civil
servants to address" international problems, principally through policy conferences;
and lobbied those in power). Indeed, voluntary, issue-oriented associations became
active in influencing international law long before the League period, "emerg[ing] at
footnote continued on next page
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In that era, there was no strong distinction between voluntary associations
that advanced business or commercial ends and those that lobbied for other
causes.1 45 Rather, associations advancing business interests were among these
influential early NGOs. They contributed to the development of international
organizations, participated in meetings, and helped draft international
treaties.1 46 According to Steve Charnovitz's masterful historical account of
NGO involvement in the work of the United Nations, the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) took its place among the top three most
significant associations in the League period (together with the Red Cross and
the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom). 147 Business
associations also participated in the League's work relating to finance,
commercial law, transportation, and pharmaceuticals, among other things.1 48
However, the League did draw a distinction between, on the one hand,
"public, semi-public and private organizations" (terms that correspond to
modern-day NGOs and international organizations) and, on the other,
"organizations with a commercial objective."1 49 For example, the League
included only the former (noncommercial) organizations in a directory of
international organizations and in publications dedicated to aggregating policy
recommendations.150 Thus during the League period, individual businesses and
entities pursuing commercial purposes were excluded as informal consultants
to the League of Nations while associations of businesses were included.
Because Article 71 of the U.N. Charter and the resulting Council regime
were meant to continue the League practice, the criteria for accreditation
maintained those earlier distinctions. The term "non-governmental
organization," or "NGO," was itself coined at the birth of the United Nations
the end of the eighteenth century, and [becoming] international by 1850." Id. at 212. "By
the end of the nineteenth century, there was a pattern of private international
cooperation evolving into public international action." Id.
144. Id. at 212.
145. Id. at 245 (noting that one of the major successes of this period was the International
Labour Organization, which engaged business and labor groups as full and equal
participants).
146. See, e.g., id. at 202 (noting that railway businesses helped form the International Railway
Congress Association, which led to the creation of the intergovernmental Central
Office for International Railway Transport); id. at 211 ("[T]he International Telegraph
Union invited private companies to participate in its meetings.").
147. See id. at 212-13, 223, 245-46 (noting that the ICC even "gained official roles" in League-
sponsored economic conferences).
148. Id. at 222-27.
149. Id. at 221.
150. See id. ("The League ... published[] the Handbook of International Organizations... [which]
included public, semi-public, and private organizations, but excluded organizations
with a commercial objective.").
227
Astroturf Activism
69 STAN. L. REv. 201 (2017)
and the drafting of Article 71.151 The term was meant, as its name suggests, to
set aside government-sponsored organizations. 152 It reflects the primary
preoccupation of the drafters, who did not seek to distinguish between
different types of voluntary associations-those associations that advanced
business aims on the one hand and public interest associations on the other.1 53
Rather, the drafters were concerned about whether to allow national NGOs to
serve as consultants (in addition to international NGOs) because of a concern
that this would allow U.N. entanglement in domestic affairs.1 54
Associations of businesses began to consult with the United Nations as
they had with the League. For example, the ICC became one of the first
associations accredited with the Council.1 55 Moreover, after the Council's 1996
rules change, the ICC became one of the comparatively small number of
organizations that received the coveted General consultative status, giving it
the broadest available consultation rights.156 The ICC has made use of this
status at the Council to engage in a broad array of activities, including
"organiz[ing] study groups, collaborat[ing] with the International Law
Association and prepar[ing] legal drafts." 5 7 It has, in fact, taken a "catalytical
role within the international legal process for producing documents that are
ultimately adopted" as legally binding on nations.158
While a whole bevy of supporters and critics has focused its attention on
the role of NGOs as international consultants, one important aspect of the legal
structure has gone underexamined and underappreciated. That aspect is the
way businesses-profit-seeking entities-fit within the consultancy system-
151. See id. at 186 & n.14.
152. See id. at 186.
153. See TULLY, supra note 106, at 66 ("Although subsuming corporations within the NGO
category suppresses important distinctions, equality of status for the purposes of
counterbalancing competing perspectives was preferred to differential access or
treatment to exploit operational specialization.").
154. Charnovitz, supra note 73, at 252-53; see also Hobe, supra note 84, ¶ 7, at 1792 (noting
that "the language of Art. 71 supports the view that the focus is primarily on establish-
ing relations between the UN and international NGOs" and, as such, indicates that
national NGOs should only have contingent access).
155. See TULLY, supra note 106, at 66.
156. Id. at 66-67.
157. Id. at 67.
158. Id.; see also id. (pointing out that treaty negotiations sometimes involve "ICC drafts
sponsored by developed states").
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specifically, how the consultancy rules apply to businesses and what the
resulting effect is on business behavior.
This Part has offered a legal analysis to answer that question. Simply put,
business entities may not become accredited as consultants. That is, they may
not become accredited as individual, profit-seeking business entities. However,
they may influence international lawmakers through proxies, channeling their
lobbying activity through nonprofit associations, which may themselves
become accredited. But this black-letter-law answer reveals even deeper
puzzles. Specifically, what is the effect of this odd legal structure on business
activity? And-crucially-what are the effects of this structure and the
resulting business activity on international lawmaking? As Part II argues, the
consultancy rules have in effect funneled business influence into NGOs,
producing an array of harmful results.
II. Astroturf Activism
"Astroturf activism," in this Article's usage, describes the phenomenon
whereby business entities gain access to international lawmakers through
front groups that obscure the identity of the profit-seeking enterprise that is
really the relevant actor. 159 This happens most starkly when business
organizations capture an existing NGO or form their own NGO with
nonprofit status and a mission statement that obscures the company's true
interests. It also happens when powerful businesses capture trade associations
that purport to speak on behalf of a wider range of actors in a particular
industry. The phenomenon may also capture the scenario where for-profit
entities escape the notice of gatekeepers and become accredited, notwithstand-
ing their noncompliance with accreditation eligibility rules.
A brief note at the outset: this conceptual framework is an oversimplifica-
tion. The simplicity, however, is useful. It focuses attention on the relevant
features of the phenomenon, the features of the consultancy laws that have
facilitated it, and starting points for reform. Because the astroturf activism
phenomenon has not received systematic attention, even the basic framework
illuminates important problems and frames existing questions.
This Part turns to those questions, first identifying methods businesses use
to obtain access to lawmakers through the consultancy system and classifying
those methods into a three-part taxonomy. Businesses gain access by:
(1) continuing the League of Nations-era practice of working through
traditional trade and industry associations; (2) defying the rules and exploiting
gatekeeping weaknesses to become accredited as individual market
participants; and (3) mimicking or capturing typical public interest-oriented,
159. For a discussion of other uses of the term "astroturf activism," see note 9 above.
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civil society NGOs.1 60 These responses bring an array of problems-which this
Part identifies as issues of transparency and access-some predictable and some
surprising.
A. Identifying the Phenomenon
The analysis that follows draws from a variety of sources, using both
primary and secondary materials to compile a preliminary study and import
insights from business and popular literatures into law.
The principal source of primary materials is the Council's own library of
resources, which the Council makes available in an online database.16 1 The
database contains basic information on all organizations that have obtained
consultancy status, which is principally gleaned from the application materials
organizations submit when they apply to be accredited as consultants. Building
on those primary materials, this Article contributes additional due diligence,
reporting the results of an original investigation to determine the context of
some of the claims in the application materials and the identities of individuals
and entities named. The results of this investigation are presented in a series of
case studies, which are meant to expose the basic contours of business access
and lay a foundation for further study.
B. Modes of Access
The descriptive analysis that follows moves through modes of access from
the most transparent to the most covert.
1. Industry and trade associations
The first mode of business access is through trade and industry associa-
tions. While these associations explicitly advance business agendas,162 they are
themselves organized as nonprofit entities and so are eligible for accreditation
with the Council. In fact, the practice of accrediting industry and trade
associations is quite historically grounded, with roots in pre-U.N. League of
Nations relationships.1 63 The practice is also relatively extensive. Of the
160. The tripartite approach to obtaining access is, of course, the aggregated product of
decisions by many different business actors, rather than of a monolithic entity with a
unitary agenda, as tempting as it may be to draw that simplified caricature.
161. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations, NGO BRANCH: DEP'T ECON. & Soc. AFF.,
http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayAdvancedSearch.do?method=search&
sessionCheck=false (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
162. TULLY, supra note 106, at 207 ("[A] legitimate and recognized purpose of trade
associations is to defend and advance the interests of enterprises they represent.").
163. See supra Part I.C.2.
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approximately 4600 associations that had obtained accreditation as consultants
with the Council as of September 2016, 458-or approximately 10%-selected
"business and industry" as an area of expertise and field of activity.164 That
figure likely does not represent the complete number of associations that
advance business or industry interests; it is merely the number that explicitly
acknowledge this focus.
While these associations also had the option to elect that they were
"private sector" organizations, the vast majority did not, preferring the more
traditional term "NGO."165 This is true even of organizations that overtly
advance private sector interests, such as the Confederation of European Paper
Industries.166
In fact, the titles and descriptions of many of these organizations in the
Council's database suggest that they are characterizing their activities so as to
amplify the public interest, non-profit-driven aspects of their work and de-
emphasize their roles as spokespeople for profit-seeking businesses.1 67 For
example, the World Coal Association, afforded Special accreditation in 1991,
seeks to "[d]eepen and broaden understanding amongst policy makers and key
stakeholders of the positive role of coal in addressing global warming,
widespread poverty in developing countries, and energy security." 68 The
164. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations, supra note 161 (to locate, search by
selecting all options from the "Organization's Type" field; then select all options from
the "Consultative Status" field; and then expand the "Areas of Expertise & Fields of
Activity" field and select "Economic and Social" and then "Business and Industry")
[hereinafter Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations Business and Industry Search].
These numbers are current as of September 30, 2016.
165. Only three out of the 458 associations that selected "business and industry" as their area
of expertise indicated that their organization type was "private sector." Advanced Search
for Civil Society Organizations, supra note 161 (to locate, search by selecting "Private
Sector" from the "Organization's Type" field; then select all options from the "Consulta-
tive Status" field; and then expand the "Areas of Expertise & Fields of Activity" field and
select "Economic and Social" and then "Business and Industry") [hereinafter Advanced
Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search]. The
three were the World Coal Association, Freann Financial Services Limited, and the
United States Sustainable Development Corporation. Id.
166. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations- Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "Confederation of European Paper Industries" hyperlink).
167. To be sure, it is one of the requirements of the accreditation process that these
associations have "aims and purposes" that support the "spirit, purposes and principles"
of the United Nations, and the associations must demonstrate that their work
promotes the work of the U.N. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, Is 2-3. However,
these associations appear to be taking pains to establish that they promote more than
just the economic work of the United Nations.
168. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations! Private Sector Business and Industry Search,
supra note 165 (to locate, select the "World Coal Association" hyperlink and then select
"Activities" under the "Profile" tab). For accreditation year, see Advanced Search for Civil
Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search, supra note 165.
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National Association of Home Builders of the United States (NAHB), which
obtained Special status in 2011, represents the U.S. homebuilding industry.'6 9 It
serves both bigger corporate members and smaller state and local builders
associations, but it affirms that one of its primary goals is to "provid[e] and
expand[] opportunities for all people to have safe, decent, and affordable
housing."1 70
Both of these organizations, while highlighting their public interest goals
in their U.N. applications, also reveal that they are principally engaged in
lobbying government officials to advance the financial interests of their
members. The World Coal Association lists among its goals that it aims to
"[a]ssist in the creation of a political climate supportive of action by
governments" to use various kinds of coal technologies as part of "national and
regional energy portfolios" and to educate relevant communities and
policymakers about the benefits of coal and the coal industry.171 The NAHB,
likewise, seeks to "[b]alance legislative, regulatory and judicial public policy"
and "[i]mprove[l [the] business performance of its members."1 72
Many of the 458 associations that claim "business and industry" as an area
of expertise and field of activity advance the interests of a particular industry
or a particular economic sector. A few examples will illuminate the kinds of
groups included:
* The World Nuclear Association, afforded Roster accreditation in 1993,
"is the global private-sector organization that seeks to promote the
peaceful worldwide use of nuclear power." 7 3 The organization's web-
site claims that its "members are responsible for virtually all of world
uranium mining, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication; all re-
actor vendors; major nuclear engineering, construction, and waste
169. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "National Association of Home Builders of the United States"
hyperlink and then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab). For accreditation year,
see Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations Business and Industry Search, supra
note 164.
170. See Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "National Association of Home Builders of the United States"
hyperlink and then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
171. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search,
supra note 165 (to locate, select the "World Coal Association" hyperlink and then select
"Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
172. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "National Association of Home Builders of the United States"
hyperlink and then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
173. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "World Nuclear Association" hyperlink and then select
"Activities" under the "Profile" tab). For accreditation year, see Advanced Search for Civil
Society Organizations Business and Industry Search, supra note 164.
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management companies; and most of the world's nuclear genera-
tion."174
* The Asociacion Regional de Empresas de Petroleo y Gas Natural en
Latinoamerica y el Caribe is an Uruguay-based NGO that obtained
Special consultative status in 1976.175 Members of the organization are
thirty-two national and international oil, gas, and biofuel companies
and institutions, including many major energy corporations like
Chevron, Petrobras, Repsol, and Spectrum.1 76 One of the organiza-
tion's principal purposes is to "promote and facilitate the industry's ...
improvement in their operational . . . and economic performance" in
addition to social, environmental, and collaborative goals.177
* The American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA) successfully
achieved Roster accreditation in 1996.178 While the AF&PA is alleged-
ly "[i]nternational" in geographic scope, its self-declared purpose is to
"sustain[] and enhance[] the interests of the US forest products indus-
try."' 79 The organization's mission statement, per its website homep-
age, is to successfully influence public policy to benefit the U.S. paper
and forest products industry.1 80 Members of AF&PA include U.S. lum-
ber, timber, and paper products companies.' 8' The European equiva-
lent-the Confederation of European Paper Industries-also received
174. World Nuclear Association Members, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS'N, http://world-nuclear.org/
our-association/membership/our-members.aspx (last visited Jan. 1, 2017); see also id.
("Other members provide international services in nuclear transport, law, insurance,
brokerage, industry analysis and finance.").
175. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select "Asociacion Regional de Empresas de Petroleo y Gas Natural en
Latinoamerica y el Caribe"). For accreditation year, see Advanced Search for Civil Society
Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note 164.
176. Member Companies, REGIONAL Ass'N OIL, GAS & BIOFUELS SECTOR COMPANIES LATIN AM.
& CARIBBEAN, https://arpel.org/actual-members (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
177. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organization: Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select "Asociacion Regional de Empresas de Petroleo y Gas Natural en
Latinoamerica y el Caribe" and then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
178. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note
164.
179. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "American Forest and Paper Association" hyperlink and then
select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
180. Mission and Vision, AM. FOREST & PAPER ASS'N, http://www.afandpa.org/about/
mission-and-vision (last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
181. Membership Directory, AM. FOREST & PAPER Ass'N, http://www.afandpa.org/about/
membership-directory (last updated Oct. 12, 2016).
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Roster accreditation, in 2004.182 Members are pulp and paper industry
associations of EU member states.183
* The European Association of Automotive Suppliers, which received
Roster status in 2002, is "[t]he voice of the automotive supply industry
in Europe ... representing an industry with . .. more than 3000 com-
panies .. . and covering all products and services within the automo-
tive supply chain."184 The industry claims a C600 billion annual
turnover. 185
* The Association of Latin American Railways (ALAF) received Roster
status in 1999.186 According to its website, ALAF represents most rail-
way companies in Latin America.1 87
Together with these industry- or sector-specific associations, others
among the 458 "business and industry"-promoting associations advance the
interests of business more generally. It has already been noted that the ICC was
one of the first organizations to receive General consultative status, and it did
so as soon as the Council's accreditation regime was developed in 1946.188 More
recently, other business-promoting organizations have joined the ranks. For
example:
* The World Union of Small and Medium Enterprises (the Union)
obtained Special status in 2013.189 The Union's objectives are to "assist
Member Institutions in their dealings with national policy and... rep-
resent the interests of [Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)] at In-
ternational-and United Nations-Organisations . . . in the event of
global economic crisis and the challenges and problems of SMEs in the
182. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizationg Business and Industry Search, supra note
164.
183. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizationv Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "Confederation of European Paper Industries" hyperlink and
then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
184. EUR. ASS'N AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIERS, http://clepa.eu (last visited Jan. 1, 2017). For
accreditation year, see Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations Business and
Industry Search, supra note 164.
185. EUR. ASS'N AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIERS, supra note 184.
186. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizationv Business and Industry Search, supra note
164.
187. uienes Somos, Ass'N LATIN AM. RAILWAYs, http://www.alaf.int.ar/acerca-de-alaf.php
(last visited Jan. 1, 2017).
188. See supra Part I.C.2.
189. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizationz Business and Industry Search, supra note
164.
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21st Century."190 The stated goal of the organization is to lobby on
behalf of these small and medium enterprises; it states that it will "effi-
ciently and effectively contribute to present proposals for solutions
and reforms on a regional level that can improve the business envi-
ronment for SMEs."191
* The Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
(Turkiye Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu), which gained
Special accreditation status in 2013, aims, as its name suggests, to pro-
mote Turkish businesses. 192 It seeks to "make [Turkish] enterprises
and entrepreneurs a part of the global world of business." 93 Interest-
ingly, the organization identifies itself to the Council as a trade union,
even though it appears to support business executives.194
* The Conf6d6ration Europ6enne des Cadres CEC, which received
Special accreditation status in 2012, likewise identifies itself to the
Council as a trade union, although it also supports managers and exec-
utives.195 The Confederation "has implemented an international man-
agers' network" and aims "[t]o express and defend the needs and points
of view of managers on current topics."1 96
2. For-profit entities
According to the Council's regulations implementing U.N. Charter Article
71, consulting organizations must be nonprofits.1 97 That is, organizations must
190. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations& Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "World Union of Small Enterprises" hyperlink and then select
"Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
191. Id. The Union does not seek to obscure its intentions as a lobbying organization,
offering as an additional objective that it will "[e]stablish itself as the premier interna-
tional organisation advocating the interests of micro-, small, and medium enterprises
(SMEs) at relevant international fora, before all national, regional and international
bodies and with leading media that shape public opinion." Id.
192. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations Business and Industry Search, supra note
164.
193. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations. Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "Turkiye Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu" hyperlink
and then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
194. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations& Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "Turkiye Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu" hyper-
link).
195. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "Conf6ddration Europdenne des Cadres CEC" hyperlink).
196. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "Conf~dbration Europ6enne des Cadres CEC" hyperlink and
then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
197. See supra Part I.B.2.
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obtain their fees from members or local affiliate organizations and not from
participation in commerce as for-profit entities.198 Nevertheless, some
companies appear to have flouted these rules and obtained accreditation despite
funding from the sale of goods or services or the fact that they are organized as
for-profit entities. In fact, at least one commentator claims that the gatekeeping
for consultancy status is quite lax. 199
For example, Freann Financial Services Limited, an organization that
received Special accreditation status in 2013, has as its mission, among other
goals, "[t]o provide lease or hire purchase financing to the private sector," "to
underwrite larger financing type transactions," and "[t]o provide management
advisory and consultancy services for its clients and other potential
customers."20 0 The company records its funding structure as "[p]roduct sales
and business services" as well as fees for consulting and research services. 20 1
The company appears to have "aims and purposes" in line with those of the
United Nations in that the capital it provides is directed to development, often
through microfinance, and the company is focused on green financing and
increasing financial literacy. 202 However, the company does not fit within the
traditional definition of an NGO, as its funding source indicates that it
generates fees for services and sells financial products.203 And, in other
respects, the company behaves like a business. It has, for example, signed on to
the U.N. Global Compact, which categorizes it as a small or medium enterprise
in the financial services sector.204
Another example of an entity that fits oddly under the "NGO" moniker is
an organization called the United States Sustainable Development Corporation
(USSDC). 205 The organization, which received Special consultative status in
198. See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 84, ¶ 13.
199. See TULLY, supra note 106, at 207.
200. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations- Private Sector Business and Industry Search,
supra note 165 (to locate, select the "Freann Financial Services Limited" hyperlink and
then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
201. Id.
202. See Letter from Kwabena Anning Frederick, Exec. Dir., Freann Fin. Servs. Ltd., to Dir.,
U.N. Glob. Compact (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/
attachments/cop_2015/188491/original/COMMUNICATION-OFPROGRESS_-
UNGLOBALCOMPACT_2015.pdf?1442243255.
203. See Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations- Private Sector Business and Industry
Search, supra note 165 (to locate, select the "Freann Financial Services Limited"
hyperlink and then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
204. Freann Financial Services Limited, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/participants/29061 (last visited Jan. 1,
2017).
205. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations7 Private Sector Business and Industry Search,
supra note 165.
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2015, calls itself a "[p]rivate sector" organization rather than an NGO.206 The
organization is involved in sustainable development, with a mission to "find
creative approaches to stimulate the local economy."207 It particularly attends
to impoverished regions of the United States "through job creation and
business development."20 8 While many of these purposes seem consistent with
the aims and purposes of the United Nations, the USSDC is organized in the
United States as a for-profit corporation, incorporated in the commonwealth of
Virginia in 2011.209 The company is funded through fees for consulting and
research services. 210 Notably, when the USSDC's application came before the
Council's Committee on NGOs, the Committee granted the application (and
therefore consultative status) without any comment.2 11 In particular, the
committee did not note or consider the alleged NGO's for-profit corporate
status or the fact that it functions as a consulting firm.212
For other organizations, funding is obtained through mixed sources, and it
is difficult to determine whether the entity has registered domestically as a
nonprofit or for-profit entity. For example, the Turkish Confederation of
'Businessmen and Industrialists-a Special accreditation consultant since
2013 213-reports the usual sources of funding for an NGO: that is, membership
fees and "[d]onations and grants from domestic sources."2 14 But the
Confederation also reports income from "[p]roduct sales and business services"
and "[flees for providing consulting or research services."2 15
Freann Financial Services, the USSDC, and the Turkish Confederation
serve as evidence of the fact that the nonprofit criterion is at best inadequately
206. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Private Sector Business and Industry Search,
supra note 165 (to locate, select the "United States Sustainable Development Corpora-
tion" hyperlink). For accreditation year, see Advanced Search for Civil Society Organiza-
tions- Private Sector Business and Industry Search, supra note 165.
207. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations7 Private Sector Business and Industry Search,
supra note 165 (to locate, select the "United States Sustainable Development Corpora-
tion" hyperlink and then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Rep. of the Comm. on Non-Governmental Orgs. on Its 2015
Resumed Session, U.N. Doc. E/2015/32 (Part II) (June 17,2015).
212. That is to say, the minutes of the meeting record no mention of the for-profit status of
this organization. See id.
213. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations7 Business and Industry Search, supra note
164.
214. Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations: Business and Industry Search, supra note
164 (to locate, select the "Turkiye Isadamlari ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu" hyperlink
and then select "Activities" under the "Profile" tab).
215. Id.
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enforced, permitting some businesses access to the consultancy regime directly
through channels meant for NGOs.
3. Grassroots mimicry and capture
The third mode of business access to the consultancy system is the one to
which the term "astroturf activism" most clearly applies: grassroots mimicry
and capture. Businesses form associations that appear to be dedicated to
nonprofit, public-regarding causes but are, in fact, mouthpieces for covert
business agendas. Alternatively, businesses capture existing associations by
placing corporate officers on NGO boards, funneling donations, offering
revolving door incentives, or creating partnerships that eviscerate the NGOs'
power to act independently. These tactics can result in mixed agendas that
render the organizations' intentions and loyalties unclear. The result is
organizations with names like "Citizens for Sensible Control of Acid Rain"
(formed by coal and electricity companies); 2 16 the "National Wetlands
Coalition" (serving U.S. oil companies and real estate developers); 2 17 .
"Consumers for World Trade" (formed by an industry coalition); 2 18 and, in the
example that opened this paper, "Center for Indoor Air Research" (captured by
the tobacco industry).219
This third mode of access, as the least transparent, is also the most chal-
lenging to uncover and map. Discerning this mode of access requires gathering
evidence from diverse primary and secondary sources and stitching it together,
a process that requires inferential leaps. Because this Article is the first to focus
analytical attention on the astroturf activism phenomenon within the
consultancy system, this account, preliminary as it is, nevertheless serves a
useful purpose. It exposes this important issue, frames the critique to follow,
and lays a foundation for a future, more systematic empirical analysis.
It appears that businesses began to use NGO mimicry and capture to gain
access to the consultancy regime right around the time of the 1996 rules change
at the Council that liberalized the access rules-the change implemented by
Resolution 1996/31.220 At that time, businesses seemed to be beginning to note
that NGOs had access to international decisionmaking processes-and
216. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOs, supra note 1, at 489.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at 48. Though the source uses
the phrase "Center for Indoor Air Quality," "Center for Indoor Air Research" is the
correct term as listed in the Glossary. See id. at 245.
220. See supra Part I.B.
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therefore influence over those processes-in a way that businesses did not.221
The business literature noted that, at least in the environmental context,
businesses had begun to copy the NGO format and "behav[e] like NGOs" in
order to accomplish a number of goals, including obtaining access to U.N.
lawmaking processes and helping to set international agendas.222 The
literature recommended that businesses appropriate the NGO format to mimic
the success of NGOs in obtaining access to international decisionmaking
processes and influencing international policy.223
At the same time, Robert Fri in 1992 acknowledged business's uneasy fit
within the NGO rubric.224 Fri noted that while business entities are certainly
nongovernmental-and familiar with the practice of banding together to
advocate for their common positions-they had not been typically interested in
advancing broader policy agendas at the international level, at least in the
environmental area.225 While businesses were familiar with the rules of the
game in the Washington, D.C. lobbying context, businesses were at the time
unfamiliar with the realm of international policy in which NGOs were
operating.226 And yet business leaders were starting to note that those NGOs
were pushing policies that could have a "profound[]" effect on business
interests 227:
What [business leaders] saw, of course, was that policies profoundly affecting
their operations were being shaped outside the system in which they operated....
221. Fri, supra note 22, at 92 (noting that the fact that NGOs had been so successful at
defining agendas-particularly with respect to climate change-was "not lost on at least
some business leaders").
222. Id. at 93.
223. See id.
224. Fri's colorful description demonstrates how striking it must have been at the time that
business would appropriate the NGO format:
The notion of the corporation as a nongovernment organization (NGO) doesn't quite
pass the "duck" test for most of us.... [Blusiness looks like an NGO duck, since most corpora-
tions are nongovernmental. It even walks like a duck, for like any good NGO, business
organizations are forever scurrying about to form coalitions to advance their shared positions
on one issue or another.
But... [a]t least on energy and environmental issues that have been so prominent on the
public policy agenda for the past 20 years, business has rarely been a voice for change. ...
[Instead it] regarded environmental protection as a costly compliance problem best left to
lobbyists and lawyers.
Id. at 91 (formatting altered).
225. See id.
226. Id. at 91-92 (noting that businesses could learn from NGOs the skills for "operat[ing]
outside the established political and economic system" to "identify issues that belong on
the official agenda, define policies . . . , and organize" to bring these issues to the
attention of deciders).
227. Id. at 92.
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It seems likely that this realization played a major role in leading business to
find ways to participate, essentially as an NGO, in the new extra-system game.
And so it did, both by gaining access to the preparations for [the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development] and the parallel climate
negotiating process, and by forming its own organizations . . . to play the NGO
role.22
8
Thus, in Fri's account, the realization that an important lobbying game was
being played outside of the traditional channels likely led to an uptick in
business interest in forming NGOs to advance its own interests. 229 Fri
concluded in 1992 that business lobbying at the domestic level "seem[ed] not to
give business the scope it needs to do the things it wants," and so he found it
plausible that "the curious sight of business as an NGO is here to stay."230 In
another article in the same business journal in the early 1990s, Larry Susskind
echoed Fri's remarks but focused specifically on the "UN-sponsored system of
environmental treaty-making."231 Business leaders should, Susskind argued,
get involved to assist the United Nations in making better treaties, whether or
not they supported the expansion of domestic or international environmental
regulation.232
There is evidence that businesses took up that early 1990s charge and
began forming or appropriating NGOs to advance their interests within the
consultancy system at the Council and elsewhere. The Tobacco Report, for
instance, shows that tobacco companies, to avoid credibility limitations, "have
frequently used surrogates in their attempts to influence the WHO's tobacco
control activities."233 These surrogates include "a variety of front organiza-
tions," some of which were existing organizations that the tobacco industry
funded and groomed for its use.234
For example, the tobacco industry insiders transformed the International
Tobacco Growers' Association (ITGA) "from an underfunded and disorganized
group of tobacco farmers into a highly effective lobbying organization."235
Tobacco industry insiders noted that the ITGA could be useful because it was
perceived as a coalition of farmers who were independent from the rest of the
tobacco industry-that is, the large tobacco companies responsible for
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 94.
231. Lawrence E. Susskind, New Corporate Roles in Global Environmental Treaty-Making,
COLUM.J. WORLD Bus., Fall & Winter 1992, at 62, 63.
232. Id. at 66, 71.
233. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at 47.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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producing and marketing products for consumers.236 The plan was for the
ITGA to "get fully accredited observer status at the [Food and Agriculture
Organization of the U.N. (FAO)]" and serve as a "front for our third world
lobby activities at WHO."237 In serving in this capacity, the tobacco companies
concluded specifically that the ITGA's "integrity and independence are of great
potential value."238 In transforming the ITGA into a "pro-active, politically
effective organisation, the industry created the opportunity to capture the
moral high ground in relation to a number of fundamental tobacco-related
issues."239 The ITGA did in fact lobby the FAO, the World Bank, and the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "to oppose or
undermine WHO tobacco control activities."240
Other organizations, the Tobacco Report found, were formed specifically
for the purpose of advancing tobacco industry interests. For example, the
Center for Indoor Air Research (CIAR) was "an ostensibly independent
scientific organization actually created by US tobacco companies" 24 1 that
proposed and funded counterresearch to challenge studies linking tobacco with
cancer.242 Other examples the Tobacco Report disclosed were the Institute for
International Health and Development, Associates for Research in the Science
of Enjoyment, and LIBERTAD.243 The Tobacco Report also noted that it found
"such a considerable body of evidence pointing to use of other organizations
with undisclosed relationships to tobacco companies, that is it [sic] likely that
the committee has identified only a small proportion of the organizations that
have such undisclosed relationships."244
Turning the clock forward to the present day, evidence of corporate
mimicry or capture of grassroots NGOs-or at a minimum very cozy
collaboration with them-persists. Some observe that these relationships are
increasing, perhaps driven by the fact that the ever-proliferating NGOs must
236. Id.
237. Id. (quoting Memorandum from John Bloxcidge to Board Members, British Am.
Tobacco Co. ¶ 1.4, at 1, ¶ 3.3, at 2 (Oct. 11, 1988) (on file with the University of
California, San Francisco Library)).
238. Id. (quoting Memorandum from John Bloxcidge, supra note 237, ¶ 1.1, at 1).
239. Id. (quoting Letter from Martin Oldman, Assistant Sec'y-Gen., Int'l Tobacco Info. Ctr.,
to Gaye Pedlow, British Am. Tobacco Co. 2 (Mar. 13, 1991) (on file with the University
of California, San Francisco Library)).
240. Id. at 48.
241. Id. at 201. The CIAR was later disbanded under the terms of a settlement agreement
between many U.S. state attorneys general and the tobacco companies. Id.
242. Id. at 51.
243. Id. at 48.
244. Id
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secure funding to maintain their activities, 245 even when corporate support
might produce mission drift or a legitimacy price tag.246
For example, in a revealing piece of investigative journalism, Fairouz El
Tom conducted a review of the "[tlop 100 NGOs"247 as identified by the Global
journaL248 El Tom investigated links between these "[t]op 100 NGOs" and the
tobacco, weapons, and finance industries. 249 Specifically, El Tom found in 2013
that of these one hundred NGOs, 54% had at least one board member affiliated
with the tobacco industry, 56% with the arms industry, and 59% with the
finance industry.250 Of the top one hundred NGOs in the study, 40% have
obtained accreditation at the Council.251 El Tom's 2015 follow-up highlighted
accredited organizations with clear links to major corporate partners. For
example, CARE International, an NGO with General consultancy status,252 has
a partnership with corporate agricultural giant Cargill (ostensibly to combat
poverty), 253 and Vital Voices, an NGO with Special consultancy status,254 has a
close relationship with Walmart (ostensibly to increase economic opportuni-
ties for women).255 In El Tom's estimate, these "[fligures reveal a clear
disjunction between the world NGOs seek to create, and the world their
245. See Nuria Molina-Gallart, Strange Bedfellows? NGO-Corporate Relations in International
Development; An NGO Perspective, 1 DEV. STUD. REs. 42, 43-44 (2014) (noting that NGO
and corporate partnerships are increasing and arguing that this increase may be borne
of NGO financial constraints).
246. See Kultida Samabuddhi, Money Can Taint NGO's Clean Image, GLOBAL POL'Y F. (Mar. 4,
2011), https://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/introduction/49912-money-can-taint-ngos
-clean-image.html (noting that corporate partnerships can raise suspicion for NGOs, as
critics worry that corporate sponsorship will produce NGO mission drift).
247. El Tom, supra note 21.
248. See The Top 100 NGOs A Complete List, GLOBAL J., Jan. & Feb. 2013, at 90, 90-9 1; see also
NEW Top 500 NGOs, http://www.top500ngos.net/the-new-top-500-ngos (last visited
Jan. 1, 2017) (updating and expanding list of top NGOs in 2015).
249. El Tom, supra note 21 (finding that over half of the "[tlop 100 NGOs" in her study had
one or more board members "affiliated with companies that invest in, or provide ...
services to the arms, tobacco and finance industries"); see also Fairouz El Tom, Annual
NGO Ranking Shows "White Savior" Status uo Remains Intact, NONPROFIT Q. (May 26,
2015) [hereinafter El Tom, White Savior], http://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/05/26/
annual-ngo-ranking-shows-white-savior-status-quo-remains-intact (updating the
study for the top NGOs on the Global Journals 2015 list).
250. El Tom, supra note 21. In a 2015 update, El Tom concluded again that "over half" the
top one hundred NGOs had corporate links to tobacco, arms, or finance. El Tom, White
Savior, supra note 249.
251. For Council accreditation status, see Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations,
supra note 161.
252. See id.
253. See El Tom, White Savior, supra note 249.
254. See Advanced Searchfor Civil Society Organizations, supra note 161.
255. See El Tom, White Savior, supra note 249.
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governance structures reproduce," 25 6 as links with corporate interests "appear
to be inconsistent with [the NGOs'] mandate or public identity."257 Other
questionable links between NGOs and business partners have garnered
controversy. For example, Conservation International, a U.S. environmental
charity, sustained criticism for close links with corporate partners including
Cargill, Chevron, Monsanto, and Shell. 258 Conservation International
nevertheless obtained Special consultative status at the Council in 2014, several
years after the controversial links were reported in the press.259
In short, this third mode of business access to the consultancy system is
what I have called "grassroots mimicry and capture" because it involves
businesses either forming sham or front groups that appear to be classic NGOs
or co-opting existing NGOs to serve as corporate mouthpieces. Because this
form of access is the most covert of the three described in this Article, it is the
most difficult to identify. It could also be the form most challenging to regulate,
as NGOs are dependent for their existence on funding and, for many, corporate
sponsorship offers a ready source of funding.260 The next Subpart addresses the
potential harms a regulatory response must address.
C. Types of Harm
The three forms of astroturf activism outlined above reveal a number of
different issues that can be organized broadly into problems of transparency
and access. As for transparency problems, the fact that the identities of the
actors driving the agenda are obscured (an opacity problem) renders more
complex the more common problem that it is difficult to determine an
organization's mission and, in turn, its fidelity to that mission (a mission
accountability problem). These problems make it challenging for gatekeepers to
do their job, which perhaps explains the fact that those gatekeepers have
largely avoided excluding organizations for opacity or mission accountability
issues (a gatekeeping problem). Finally, a legal regime that forces nonprofit
organizations either to engage in astroturf activism or to not participate at all
256. El Tom, supra note 21; see also id. ("Many would question whether association with the
arms and tobacco industries is compatible with the promotion of ideals of justice and
social progress. Even if no position of principle is taken, however, NGOs certainly
need to explain how association with these industries is consistent with their
objectives.").
257. El Tom, White Savior, supra note 249.
258. See, e.g., Tom Levitt, Conservation International "Agreed to Greenwash Arms Company,"
ECOLOGIST (May 11, 2011), http://www.theecologist.org/News/news-analysis/877241/
conservation-international-agreed-to-greenwash-arms-company.html.
259. See Advanced Search for Civil Society Organizations, supra note 161.
260. See Molina-Gallart, supra note 245, at 43-44.
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sacrifices benefits the private sector may otherwise offer to the lawmaking
process (an access problem).
1. Opacity
Astroturf activism, as defined in these pages, is the phenomenon whereby
an organization like CARE can advance the agenda of Cargill before
international organizations, including at U.N.-sponsored treaty conferences. 261
As the preceding paragraphs have demonstrated, the distorted nature of this
phenomenon is most starkly apparent when business organizations capture
purportedly independent associations, such as the CIAR, or form their own
associations, such as the National Wetlands Coalition.262 In both cases, the
association's nonprofit status, benign mission statement, and often public-
regarding title obscure the sponsoring company's profit-seeking motives.
Astroturf activism also describes the related scenario in which powerful
businesses capture trade associations that purport to speak on behalf of a wider
range of actors in a particular industry but in fact are captured by a single actor
or a set of powerful actors. This happened, for example, in the context of the
Tobacco Convention, when the tobacco industry co-opted the ITGA.263 While
the trade association "claims to represent the interests of local farmers," as the
Tobacco Report noted, in fact the organization was "funded" and "directed" by
major multinational tobacco companies such as Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds,
and the British American Tobacco Company.264
Finally, the astroturf activism phenomenon also captures the scenario in
which for-profit entities escape the notice of gatekeepers and become accredited,
notwithstanding the noncompliance of these associations with accreditation
eligibility rules.265 It is challenging for a gatekeeper or onlooker to police
whether an association is a nonprofit or for-profit entity because international
gatekeepers rely on the representations of the association itself and a company
obtains nonprofit or for-profit status at the domestic level by registering with
a national or local government.266
261. See supra Part II.B.3.
262. See supra Part II.B.3.
263. TOBACCO COMPANY STRATEGIES REPORT, supra note 30, at 7 ("[T]obacco companies
made prominent use of the International Tobacco Growers' Association (ITGA) ...
[which] claims to represent the interests of local farmers. The documents indicate,
however, that tobacco companies have funded the organization and directed its
work.").
264. Id.; see also id. at 2 (identifying the relevant tobacco companies).
265. This latter phenomenon was described in Part II.B.2 above.
266. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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In short, the current system allows-and perhaps even encourages-the
funneling of business views into NGOs or their aggregation into trade
associations. In such a regime, it is very difficult for international lawmakers,
officials, and academic or public critics to determine which entity is trying to
advance which goals.
2. Mission accountability
Indeed, the interest-mapping problem is a subspecies of a larger problem
that Dana Brakman Reiser and Claire R. Kelly call a "mission accountability"
problem, which can bedevil any regime that accepts organizations as
consultants or lawmakers.267 Mission accountability, in the Reiser and Kelly
formulation, "means that the organization owes fealty to achieving its
particular goals or purpose, i.e., its mission."268 In the consultancy arena, an
accredited organization must have "aims and purposes" that align with the
goals of the United Nations as a whole or the particular agency or organ to
which the organization is accredited as a consultant.269 This "aims and
purposes" requirement-which is replicated both in Article 71 of the U.N.
Charter and in the Council's implementing regulations-clearly puts an onus
on gatekeepers to determine the mission and purpose of a given organization
when those gatekeepers admit the organization to the consultancy ranks.270
Setting aside the gatekeeping problem for a moment, consider the experi-
ence of a lawmaker who is weighing the contributions of a number of
accredited organizations that have offered opinions with respect to a
lawmaking project. An international lawmaker must be able to identify and
rely on the authenticity of the mission the organization pursues in order for
the lawmaker to effectively assess that input.27 1 This is true whether the
lawmaker seeks the input of organizations for the purpose of gaining valuable
expertise from those organizations or, instead, for enhancing the legitimacy of
267. Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire R. Kelly, Linking NGO Accountability and the Legitimacy
of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1011, 1047 (2011) ("For an NGO involvement
to enhance the legitimacy of global governance, its mission must align with the global
governance goals of an international regulator or the international community.").
268. Id. at 1022.
269. See supra Part I.B.2.
270. Moreover, to effectively implement this Article 71 legal requirement, it would be
necessary to institute some sort of ongoing monitoring or screening function to
respond to the mission accountability issue Reiser and Kelly have identified. Organiza-
tions with Council accreditation are required to submit regular reports. See E.S.C. Res.
1996/31, supra note 84, IS 55, 61 (requiring accredited consultants to submit quadrenni-
al reports). But some query whether this reporting system is effective at policing
mission accountability. Cf Reiser & Kelly, supra note 267, at 1050 (noting that global
regulators need to address the regulatory gap).
271. See Reiser & Kelly, supra note 267, at 1049.
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the decisional process by weighing a variety of viewpoints prior to making a
decision.272 Organizations cannot contribute to the "input" legitimacy of a
lawmaking process-that is, the integrity of a process of decisionmaking-
unless it is possible for lawmakers to be assured of the mission accountability
of the organizations that participate.273
Moreover, in addition to lawmakers, critics and onlookers are also ill
equipped to assess the input legitimacy of an international lawmaking process
unless they, too, are able to assess the mission accountability of the participant
organizations. In other words, beyond lawmakers and gatekeepers, mission
accountability is also a problem for observers who are trying to assess the
legitimacy of the process of decisionmaking by determining which interests
were accommodated in that lawmaking process.
Reiser and Kelly note that, for a number of reasons, mission accountability
is "difficult to track and enforce."274 The descriptive analysis offered in this
Article adds a further layer of complication to this problem. In particular, the
astroturf activism phenomenon adds the potential for mixed, indeterminate,
and profit-driven motives, and it reduces the capacity of international
lawmakers and onlookers to evaluate mission accountability.
In addition to mission accountability problems, Reiser and Kelly identify
financial accountability as another potential problem to guard against. In
defining financial accountability, Reiser and Kelly focus on the tendency of
organizations to use funds inappropriately to benefit insiders, "skimming off
funds" and leaving the organization with fewer resources to pursue its
272. See id.
273. Input legitimacy refers to "participation in, and the process of, decision making." Id. at
1016. See generally Allen Buchanan & Robert 0. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global
Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 405, 406-07 (2006) (identifying input and
output legitimacy criteria); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale.
Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE LJ. 1490, 1493-94 (2006) (arguing that
administrative law principles like opportunity to comment and power sharing affect
the legitimacy of international processes).
274. Reiser & Kelly, supra note 267, at 1029. It is, first, difficult to find "how and where a
nonprofit's mission is articulated." Id. Then, even if one does find an organization's
mission statement, that statement "may be quite general, such as an organization
formed for 'religious' or 'educational' purposes." Id. at 1029-30. Missions can evolve over
time. See id. at 1030. Moreover, there are few domestic or international mechanisms to
police whether an organization holds to any particular mission. See id at 1030-31
(noting that under U.S. domestic law, the key officials charged with policing nonprofit
mission accountability are state attorneys general and the IRS but the "tools with
which these regulators are equipped are ill-suited to enforcing mission accountability").
In fact, although Reiser and Kelly note that "mission accountability is fundamental to
an NGO's legitimacy as an entity, . . . [m]onitoring mission at every turn" would be
impractical and counterproductive because it would "require regulators to devote vast
resources and would diminish NGOs' ability to innovate in a sphere separate from
government influence." Id. at 1035-36.
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mission.275 While astroturf activism is not a financial accountability problem
per se, it is a mission accountability problem that is affected by an organiza-
tion's financial pressures and incentives. When an organization accepts large
donations, it faces pressure to accommodate the preferences of those donors.
That organization becomes more susceptible to capture. The result of
inappropriate use of funds and inappropriate acceptance of funds can merge. As
Reiser and Kelly put it, without financial accountability, "NGOs risk becoming
ineffective or even sham organizations, which are inadequate to regulate or
contribute to the work of other global regulators." 276
3. Gatekeeping
The opacity and mission accountability issues caused or exacerbated by
astroturf activism place added burdens on an already taxed gatekeeping system.
Gatekeeping is the province of the NGO Committee, 277 which meets only
twice per year to vote on pending applications, most of which it eventually
approves.278 But the NGO Committee's work is plagued by political
obstruction, 279 a ballooning workload as an increasing number of organiza-
tions seek accreditation, 28 0 and limited capacity to investigate the veracity of
the information presented for its review.28 1 These limitations make it difficult
for the committee to effectively assess whether an aspiring consultant fronts
for a for-profit entity.282 The astroturf activism phenomenon thus both
exposes the limitations of the gatekeeping that exists and potentially serves as
one of the many factors that overwhelm it.
275. Id. at 1044-45.
276. Id. at 1047.
277. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. The presumption toward accreditation is so
strong that denied applications were usually deferred rather than closed. See Econ. &
Soc. Council, Rep. of the Comm. on Non-Governmental Orgs. on Its 2014 Resumed
Session ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. E/2014/32 (Part II) (June 12, 2014).
279. See Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 359 ("The work of the committee in granting and
reviewing accreditation of NGOs has been criticized for overpoliticization and lack of
due process." (citing Cardoso Report, supra note 29, at 54)).
280. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
281. Hartwick, supra note 100, at 224 n.45 (noting that an aspiring consultant's compliance
with the accreditation criteria is assessed by a review of the organization's application
materials and that "the UN does not actually verify" the information contained in these
documents).
282. Domestic mechanisms do not currently perform this task effectively. Reiser & Kelly,
supra note 267, at 1050 ("[E]nforcement of domestic nonprofit law will not sufficiently
guard NGOs' mission accountability.").
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4. Access
An additional kind of potential harm emerges from the current accredita-
tion rules because they exclude direct business input into the accreditation
process. The legal rules that structure the consultancy regime offer an
incentive and, in fact, an imperative for major corporate actors to speak
through nonprofits; otherwise, corporate perspectives go unheard.
While commentators sometimes note that for-profit entities can thwart
public agendas,283 business input can also have positive effects on the
international process. Involving business in international lawmaking can
sometimes produce better rules, reduce business resistance to the rules
ultimately adopted, and facilitate a more effective international lawmaking
process.284 Thus, the current consultancy rules cause harm in part because they
exclude major international corporations from having direct access to the
international lawmaking process. Corporate actors that seek to contribute
their expertise and perspectives are forced to make use of the accreditation
regime designed for nonprofit members of civil society. There is no parallel
access mechanism for corporate actors that seek to act directly. Corporate
actors are required to: engage in astroturf activism, find alternative channels to
reach international lawmakers, or forgo any form of input. Because companies
are forced into covert activity rather than having the chance to act directly,
international lawmakers miss out on valuable benefits these corporate actors
might have to offer through direct engagement.
Of course, not all will agree that the lack of a direct channel of access for
business entities is a bug rather than a feature of the current system. Here are a
few potential counterarguments:
First, direct access for business entities might give businesses too much
access to officials and lawmakers, drowning out other voices, decreasing the
legitimacy of a lawmaking process, or increasing nefarious and destructive
influences. This may be a particular concern because businesses may play a
two-level game, lobbying both domestic and international officials. Moreover,
businesses may continue to use front groups even if they enjoy the benefits of
direct access, unduly duplicating their impact.
283. This is, of course, one of the concerns animating the debate over the Citizens United
decision. See sources cited supra notes 4-5.
284. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Transnational Corporations and Developing Public
International Law, 1983 DuKE L.J. 748, 787-88 (arguing for an expanded role for
transnational corporations in international lawmaking on the theory that these
corporations would be more likely to accept international law rules if they regarded
these rules as legitimate and that legitimacy would be enhanced by corporate access to
the rulemaking process); Durkee, supra note 6, at 295-96 (noting that business
participation in the process of treatymaking can contribute technical expertise and
break political logjams, facilitating negotiations between differently situated states).
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Second, even if direct business access does not cause the harms just men-
tioned, it may increase at least the appearance of corruption and illegitimacy,
which international officials and lawmakers may seek to avoid.
Finally, forcing businesses to speak through NGOs may serve a tempering
function. Requiring businesses to engage in conversations with nonprofits
could prove to be useful in restraining and enhancing the socially useful aspects
of the business contribution to the lawmaking process. Clearly, more data are
needed to determine whether this potential counterargument has a basis in
fact; it offers a productive avenue for future research.
Putting aside the final point, the first two concerns might be ameliorated
by legal reforms that sufficiently identify and respond to the astroturf activism
phenomenon. The next Part begins with three different kinds of analysis,
addressing the genesis, persistence, and coherence of the current legal
structure, and then concludes with some preliminary proposals as to how such
reforms might be structured.
III. Accounting for Astroturfing
The early twenty-first century reflects a new epoch of engagement
between three sets of actors: states, business entities, and civil society. 285 The
international system both evinces the new patterns of engagement and
struggles to adapt its legal structures to the challenges these new relationships
present.286 While this struggle may be seen throughout the international
system, this Article explores a particular example of it: the U.N. consultancy
system, which reveals an area where legal rules fail to accommodate the
changing nature of relationships between the state, businesses, and civil
society. This Article argues that the new facts require new legal tools to
effectively regulate the respective contributions of each of these actors to
international lawmaking.
This Part constructs an analysis of the U.N. consultancy rules that facilitate
astroturf activism. The analysis is tripartite. It begins with a historical account
285. Other commentators have noted the blurring of lines between state actors on the one
hand and nonstate actors such as businesses and NGOs on the other. See, e.g., Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 547 (2000) (noting
the "deep interdependence among public and private actors in accomplishing the
business of governance"). This Article instead focuses on the blurring of lines between
two different kinds of nonstate actors: businesses and NGOs. Nevertheless, identifying
the three as distinct categories of actors serves as a useful means of shorthand and one
that is customary in the literature. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 50, at 513
(describing transnational regulation as the product of a "[g]overnance [tiriangle"
between states, firms, and NGOs (bolding omitted)).
286. This Article uses the term "international system" to refer to the organizations, courts,
networks, and other institutions that organize and regulate global society.
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of the rise of business entities as global actors, demonstrating that the social
facts on which the consultancy structure is founded have changed, rendering
the current rules outdated and unsuited to the phenomena they regulate. This
historical account explains the existence of rules that respond poorly to the
astroturf activism phenomenon. Next, a functional account identifies
efficiency reasons for the persistence of that legal structure. This Part then
asserts that the current structure exhibits conceptual incoherence between a
principle of pluralistic equality on the one hand and an instrumentalist
approach to admitting consultants on the other.
Finally, this Part builds on the three-part analysis of the consultancy
regime to identify potential avenues for reform. One potential reform strategy
would open a regulatory pathway to include individual businesses, providing
them more direct access to state-driven lawmaking processes and offering
states and international lawmakers more opportunities for regulatory control
of that business access. An alternate reform strategy would require enhanced
disclosures, relying on interested third parties to identify the more pernicious
forms of astroturf activism and arming those third parties to do so more
effectively. Either approach may offer benefits for international legal
structures beyond the Council's consultancy regime, serving as a blueprint for
wider legal reform.
A. History: Epochs of Engagement
Astroturf activism can be explained by the historical development of the
relationship between states and business entities, as well as the development of
the relationship between each of those two entities and civil society. As Part I
described, the U.N. consultancy regime codified, and thus froze in time, the
League of Nations-era consultancy practice.287 Although the legal rules
structuring the consultancy regime were updated in 1996, that update did not
change the Council's basic approach to business entities, which remains the
same in its essential details as it was in the early twentieth century. Yet in the
intervening century, the nature of multinational enterprises-specifically their
global power and their relationships with states-has undergone profound and
fundamental changes. The argument of this Part, then, is that the flaws in the
law are rooted in obsolescence. Thus, while Part I.B offered a historical account
of the Council's exclusion of business entities from the consultancy system, this
Part constructs the obsolescence argument by mapping that history onto a
separate account of the development of business entities during this time.
287. See supra Part I.C.
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1. Epoch One: League of Nations
In the early twentieth century, when the League of Nations practice
developed, it was practical for businesses to communicate with international
organizations solely through trade or industry associations in part because few
businesses would have had the capacity to participate in international
lawmaking on their own behalves. While some colonial trading companies
functioned as transnational entities as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the number of entities operating across national borders remained
small until the time of the Industrial Revolution.288 It was during that period-
between 1850 and 1914-that more businesses began to emerge as transnational
entities.2 89 Even so, the late nineteenth century was a period of only limited
transnational business development. The growth was limited initially to
British firms,290 followed around the turn of the twentieth century by
emerging U.S. firms.291 And, even then, the growth was limited in scope and
focused on former colonizers and their former colonies. 292
Thus, the early twentieth-century League of Nations practice emerged in a
period in which few businesses operated across national borders, had the
capacity to lobby international decisionmakers, and had the motivation to do
so. On the other hand, associations of businesses, like the ICC, were active at
this time alongside other voluntary organizations like the Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom.293 Because economic develop-
ment organizations were among those animating the League of Nations at this
time, it would have been perfectly natural that economically motivated
voluntary associations would have had status equal to that of other kinds of
voluntary associations.
2. Epoch Two: U.N. Charter
In 1945, at the time of the drafting of the U.N. Charter, the international
community was just emerging from the second period in the development of
288. PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 8-9 (2d ed. 2007)
(noting that although the "great European colonial trading companies" were commis-
sioned in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Industrial Revolution ushered in
technologies that enabled many more entities to function across borders, so most
economists date the emergence of multinational business entities to this period).
289. Id. at 10 (explaining that, in this period, multinational business entities "began to
emerge as part of the newly developing modern industrial economy").
290. Id.
291. Id. at 10-11.
292. See id. at 12 (noting that, in this time, cross-national investment was focused on African
and Asian colonies and the newly independent Latin American nations).
293. See supra Part I.C.2.
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modern multinational entities.294 That period, stretching from 1918 to 1939,
featured a much slower rate of development due to instability in the world
economy, significantly more nationalistic economic policies, and national
cartels in various industry sectors. 295 Thus, because business-promoting
nonprofit associations had been operating alongside other kinds of voluntary
associations since the early twentieth century in the international system-and
business entities had not acquired substantially greater power, influence, or
transnational capacity in the intervening time-the U.N. drafters (and later the
Council) did not erect a new distinction between profit-focused consultants
and everyone else. In fact, these actors were not focused on the issue of business
entities, either individually or in associations.296 There was simply not yet
reason to change the first epoch's accreditation structure.
3. Epoch Three: 1990s-era reforms
Next was an era of massive growth of business entities and the transfor-
mation of many of these businesses into fully transnational and multinational
actors. This third epoch of multinational business development followed
World War II, stretching from 1945 to 1990.297 In that period, multinational
enterprises "acquired unprecedented importance in international produc-
tion."298 First, American firms grew rapidly in the first decade and a half after
World War II and were globally dominant until the 1970s.299 Then came a
period, starting in the 1960s, of international competition, as European and
Japanese firms emerged from the shocks of World War II and were joined by
newly industrialized economies-China and the formerly socialist countries in
Eastern Europe.30 0 The rapid growth in multinational corporations in the
third epoch brought a literature suspicious of that growth and increasing
global power.30 1 Also in this time social scientists began to draw distinctions
294. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 288, at 12.
295. Id.
296. As noted in Part I.B above, by 1945, when the United Nations enshrined the League of
Nations practice in Article 71, the drafters were instead preoccupied with the
distinction between national and international voluntary associations. See also E.S.C.
Res. 1296 (XLIV), supra note 84, ¶ 7 (defining an NGO as "[a]ny international organiza-
tion which is not established by intergovernmental agreement").
297. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 288, at 15.
298. Id.
299. See id. at 15-18.
300. See id. at 18-21.
301. See, e.g., RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S.
ENTERPRISES (1971) (providing an account of the future wherein multinational power
would grow at the expense of state power); see also John Gerard Ruggie, Business and
Human Rights The Evolving International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 819, 819 (2007)
footnote continued on next page
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between economic actors on the one hand and the remainder of nonstate actors
on the other, with the latter coming to be known as "civil society." 302
While it would seem that this change in the nature of business entities
might militate toward a change in the consultancy access rules, that change did
not occur because, again, the Council was focused on a different issue:
heightened awareness of disparities between the developing world and
industrialized states.303 The new accreditation rules therefore affected the
types of organizations to be accredited only on the margins and did not
produce a wholesale change. Specifically, the rules did not reframe the role of
businesses as consultants in light of the Epoch Three growth in those entities.
4. Epoch Four: globalization of influence
Finally, the decades since 1990 have been characterized by rampant
globalization. As one commentator expressed, business entities have now
grown so much that "[t]hey appear to be a power unto themselves." 304 Many
businesses have acquired size and economic capacity that rivals that of states.305
Many more of them have become transnational entities, with supply chains
crossing national borders and transnational or global distribution of goods and
services.306 Many of them have become actively involved in self-regulation and
(noting that the United Nations "attempted to establish binding international rules to
govern the activities of transnationals in the 1970s").
302. See generally JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY
(1992) (elaborating a three-part model that distinguishes civil society, economic society,
and political society). Cohen and Arato noted in 1992 that "[t]he concept of civil society
... has become quite fashionable today, thanks to struggles against communist and
military dictatorships in many parts of the world." Id. at vii.
303. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. Thus, the 1996 rules change focused on
enhancing the diversity of associations and interests represented among the consult-
ants, particularly with respect to amplifying voices in the developing world. See supra
notes 91-92 and accompanying text. It was also responsive to a literature that
challenged the legitimacy of participation by these associations and thus focused on
demanding internal governance structures that made associations accountable to their
members. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
304. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 288, at 3; see also id. ("It is often said that the major
[multinational enterprises] have a turnover larger than many nation states, that they
are powerful enough to set their own rules and to sidestep national regulation.").
305. See Philippe Sands, Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 527, 541 n.39 (2001) (noting that some global corporations have
"annual operating budgets vastly in excess of most states").
306. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 288, at 21-22 (arguing that this period brought "adoption of
truly global production chains by [multinational enterprises] and their associates, a
marked shift from raw materials and manufacturing towards services based [foreign
direct investment], and the development of major regional trade and investment
liberalization regimes, alongside the establishment of the WTO").
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co-regulation with states.307 Their capacities to lobby spread from principally
national activity to include significant foreign, transnational, and international
lobbying as well.308 Their partnership and consent became indispensable to
many projects at the heart of the international agenda, such as development,
trade, and climate change. 309 Innovations such as benefit corporations (which
seek "triple bottom line" economic, environmental, and social returns) and
social finance (which "operates at the intersection of commerce and
philanthropy") have blurred lines between business actors and civil society
actors.310 Indeed, as Sarah Dadush notes, "[i]n a world of diminishing public
funding for addressing social problems, governments and international
organizations are evermore eager to put private investment to work in the
social sphere."3 1 But this fourth epoch of mixed interests, where corporations
and impact investors pursue public goods together with private profit, comes
with risks.312 The risks include the potential for conflicts of interest and
mission drift that can ultimately undermine these public goods and cause
serious harm.313
As this historical account makes clear, one way to understand the charac-
teristics of the current accreditation regime is to view it as a historical relic
born of early twentieth-century League of Nations relationships that has
persisted long past its shelf life. That is, the consultancy rules have persisted
into a time when the entities in that relationship have so fundamentally altered
307. See, e.g., HAUFLER, supra note 50, at 3-4 (offering case studies that explore the
phenomenon of industry self-regulation in codes of conduct and coordinated
standards); Danielsen, supra note 50, at 412 (identifying private businesses' varying
roles in global governance); Freeman, supra note 285, at 547 (identifying business
participation in shaping the content of regulatory rules in the United States in what
the author describes as a process of contractual co-creation, rather than traditional top-
down, command-and-control regulation); Scherer & Palazzo, supra note 50, at 911
("Business firms engage in processes of self-regulation through 'soft laul in instances
where state agencies are unable or unwilling to regulate.").
308. See Ruggie, supra note 301, at 819 (referring to the "expanding reach and growing
influence of transnational corporations").
309. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Are Corporations "Subjects" of International Law?, 9 SANTA CLARA J.
INT'L L. 1, 5 (2011) ("[Clorporations ... have exerted considerable influence in the
making of rules governing trade, investment, antitrust, intellectual property, and
telecommunications .... ).
310. Sarah Dadush, Regulating Social Finance: Can Social Stock Exchanges Meet the Challenge?, 37
U. PA.J. INT'L L. 139, 143, 159-60 (2015).
311. Id. at 143; see also id. at 143-44 ("We've got a great idea here that can really transform
our societies by using the power of finance to tackle the most difficult social problems
that we face." (quoting David Cameron, U.K. Prime Minister, Speech at the Social
Impact Investment Forum (June 6, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/
speeches/prime-ministers-speech-at-the-social-impact-investment-conference)).
312. See id. at 144-45.
313. See id.
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that the categories the rules were built on no longer retain their form. It is only
over time that the great mass of organizations now known as "civil society"
began to be understood as distinct from profit-motivated business organiza-
tions.31 4 Now, trade and industry associations are treated as "civil society" even
though businesses are otherwise distinguished. At the same time, those profit-
motivated businesses now have a greater capacity to participate in internation-
al processes on their own, rather than through associations. They have
elsewhere begun to take much more substantial roles as transnational power
brokers, standard setters, and participants in international governance.
The historical critique suggests that the astroturf activism phenomenon
stems from a significantly evolved relationship between business entities and
states (and, in turn, international organizations) and legal rules that do not
accommodate these new social facts. In other words, the positive historical
account gives rise to the normative critique that while the regime may have
been appropriate in the early twentieth-century social context, it no longer
serves well in the context of a very different set of social facts. This account
shows which solutions lie behind-the unitary approach of Epochs One and
Two and the 1990s-era sharp divisions between economic actors and the
remainder of civil society-and which lie ahead-an approach that recognizes
the reality that businesses are, in fact, powerful global actors deeply involved
in global governance. Thus, the historical account appears to point toward a
legal structure that accommodates business actors but better reveals economic
and profit-seeking agendas to ameliorate the harms of opacity, mission
accountability, and gatekeeper incapacity identified in Part II.C above.
B. Function: An Efficiency Analysis
While the historical account casts the consultancy regime as a product of
the particular social context in which it developed, this Subpart introduces a
second positive account of the consultancy regime. That is, there is a second
way to answer the question, "Why does the consultancy regime persist in its
current form?" The answer takes the form of an efficiency account.
The efficiency explanation arises from the observation that avoiding the
astroturf activism phenomenon at the accreditation or NGO annual reporting
stages would be costlier than the structure that currently exists, which sends
on downstream the burden to ferret out astroturf activism. Those downstream
actors are the international organization officials and lawmakers who
ultimately receive the consultants' input. Thus, the existing accreditation
314. See generally COHEN & ARATO, supra note 302 (tracing the history of the term "civil
society" and distinguishing civil society from business actors); JOHN EHRENBERG, CIVIL
SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA (1999) (examining the historical, political,
and theoretical development of the concept of civil society).
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structure relieves the burden on the NGO Committee to assess the bona fides of
would-be consultants by placing the admission threshold very low. Instead, it
shifts that burden to the lawmakers who are later at the receiving end of that
consultant lobbying. In the current structure, those lawmakers, many of whom
are accepting NGO input to try to preside over a legitimate process, are the
ones who must decide whether the actors presenting position statements and
other comments are public-regarding NGOs, corporate mouthpieces, or
something in between. That work has not been done for them upstream, at the
accreditation stage.
Why leave it to the downstream officials and lawmakers to assess the
authenticity of NGO positions, rather than placing this burden on the
upstream accreditation gatekeepers? The efficiency argument is that the
Council gatekeepers are the actors best positioned to effect a change in the
accreditation rules, so the rule that persists will be the rule most helpful to
those gatekeepers. And, in fact, an overly inclusive accreditation standard
conserves limited gatekeeper resources, so that is the rule that persists.
Gatekeeper resources are limited for a number of reasons. In fact, over six
hundred organizations applied for consultative status in the 2014-2015 one-year
period.315 And tracing lines of accountability for NGOs is notoriously
difficult.316 Moreover, it is difficult to determine the functional mission of an
organization and ensure that the organization maintains a stable mission over
time.317 The Council has implemented some safeguards, such as requiring
organizations to report income streams and governance structures.3 18 But even
with these reporting requirements, there is no simple or consistently effective
way to ferret out business influence in NGOs, as the astroturf activism
phenomenon exemplifies.3 19 Nor is there a simple or consistently effective way
315. See Rep. of the Comm. on Non-Governmental Organizations on Its 2015 Regular
Session, U.N. Doc. E/2015/32 (2015); Rep. of the Comm. on Non-Governmental
Organizations on Its 2015 Resumed Session, U.N. Doc. E/2015/32 (2015).
316. There is a robust literature on this point. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 25, at 843
(evaluating NGOs' "external" accountability as supposed representatives of the
"peoples" of the world and noting the "open and contested" nature of questions in this
area); Blitt, supra note 61, at 367-68 (noting that controls have not been put into place to
ensure NGO accountability); Reiser & Kelly, supra note 267, at 1011 (suggesting that
domestic nonprofit law offers some measures to resolve the accountability deficits);
Weiss, supra note 25, at 358 (noting that it can be difficult for donors and others to hold
NGOs accountable); see also Charnovitz, supra note 62, at 893 & n.15 (collecting
literature on accountability).
317. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
318. See supra Part I.B.2.
319. For instance, consider an NGO that advances clean energy goals but reports corporate
membership and funding. How will this organization balance its clean energy goals
with the interests of its corporate shareholders, and how will gatekeepers ascertain this
footnote continued on next page
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to determine whether an organization that has ties to profit-seeking companies
will promote public-regarding rules or rather advance rules that serve the
economic bottom line while ultimately proving detrimental to other U.N. aims
and purposes.320 All of these factors place an enormous burden on the actors
that must assess which organizations to admit to the consultancy regime and
which to exclude. A functionalist reading of this structure suggests that the
broadly inclusive standards exist because they do not waste gatekeeper
resources by entangling the Council or its NGO Committee in an attempt to
make decisions these entities simply lack the capacity to make effectively.32 1
The efficiency account leads to a normative prescription that would focus
reform efforts on the bounded capacity of NGO Committee gatekeepers and
the Council's reporting monitors. One approach would be to address not the
initial gatekeepers and monitors but rather those downstream lawmakers who
will later receive input from the accredited consultants and weigh the value of
the ideas those consultants propose. Those downstream lawmakers could be
assisted, for instance, by disclosure requirements that are better tailored to
assessing the astroturf activism phenomenon, which the current rules do not
address.322 They might also be assisted if more of those disclosures by
consultants (in initial applications or ongoing reports) were publicly available
in a searchable database. Making disclosures publicly available would make
these disclosures available to the lawmakers themselves, and they would also
equip third parties to more effectively assist those lawmakers. Third parties
could then help police the bona fides of accredited organizations. For example,
other consulting NGOs would then be better equipped to respond to
contributions they see as harmful and inconsistent with an organization's
stated mission and elevate those concerns to lawmakers.
323
balance? The current consultation regime offers no mechanism to address this kind of
potential mission accountability issue.
320. Cf Dadush, supra note 310, at 144-47 (noting potential harms that flow from mission
drift).
321. There may also be a political economy story at play here, which would flow from the
presumption that government agencies wish to preserve and consolidate their power
and authority. Permissive accreditation criteria permit more discretion by the Council
and its NGO Committee gatekeepers and thus allow the Council to have more control
over which associations will be admitted as consultants than a more highly developed
set of rules would.
322. For further discussion, see Part III.D.2 below.
323. Enhanced disclosure could be facilitated by, for example, opening a separate regulatory
pathway for business entities and business-supporting associations. See infra Part III.D.2.
The proposal is preliminary, however, and merits more sustained analysis.
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C. Normative Theory: Pluralistic Equality
While the previous Subparts offered historical and functional critiques of
the consultancy rules, this Subpart moves on to the third form of analysis,
which is a normative evaluation of the jurisprudential coherence of the
consultancy structure. This form of critique deserves a sustained analysis that
is beyond the scope of this Article. However, a preliminary examination
suggests that the consultancy regime is conceptually incoherent: while it
exhibits characteristics of both pluralism and an instrumentalist "mediating
institutions"324 theory, it does not consistently follow either principle.
The term "pluralism" has a variety of definitions and usages, 325 but it is
often used to describe and analyze the relationships between state and nonstate
actors.326 In one formulation, relevant to our topic, the basic thesis of pluralism
is that "the State is but one of a number of associations within society."327 In
fact, states-and, in turn, international organizations constituted by states-are
not "the sole originator[s] and interpreter[s] of law."328 Rather, in the pluralist
vision, "all associations in society, from ... [national] government[s] down to
the smallest and most marginalized group, are formally equal and are entitled
to dignity and consideration-to sovereignty in their own affairs."329 By
extension, international organizations constituted by states are on the same
footing as states and other associational groups. 330
324. Snyder, supra note 80, at 366.
325. See, e.g., PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW
BEYOND BORDERS 12 n.25 (2012) (collecting literature on pluralism); Erez Aloni, The
Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 317, 318-19 (2016) (discussing
definitions of pluralism); Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1421-29 (2012) (discussing various justifications for pluralism in
private law).
326. Meghan Campbell & Geoffrey Swenson, Legal Pluralism and Women's Rights After
Conflict The Role of CEDAW, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2805359 ("Definitions [of pluralism] are
almost always rooted in idealized notions of how the state and non-state justice systems
should operate."). But see BERMAN, supra note 325, at 14 ("[H]ard-line pluralists will
complain that a view focusing on how official actors respond to hybridity is overly
state-centric.").
327. Snyder, supra note 80, at 389; see also BERMAN, supra note 325, at 12-13 ("[L]egal
pluralists have long noted that law does not reside solely in the coercive commands of a
sovereign power. Rather, law is constantly constructed through the contest of ...
various norm-generating communities." (footnote omitted)).
328. Snyder, supra note 80, at 389; see also BERMAN, supra note 325, at 12 ("Pluralism ...
recognizes that our conception of law must include more than just officially sanctioned
governmental edicts or formal court documents. . . . [M]any different non-state
communities assert various forms of jurisdiction and impose all kinds of normative
demands.").
329. Snyder, supra note 80, at 389.
330. See id.
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Because the pluralist thesis puts the state on the same ground as all other
associations, the theory holds that it is not the state's role to choose between
organizations and elevate some over others.33 1 Rather, in the pluralist
conception, "[e]ach of these groups is organized for a purpose, and each is an
end in itself, not merely a piece of the 'State's machinery."' 332 Pluralistic
principles thus justify a regulatory structure that facilitates the flourishing of a
diversity of groups and associations alongside the state.
Nevertheless, pluralistic principles do not require nonintervention.
Because there will, of course, be conflicts between different associational
groups, any society will develop "mechanisms to mediate the conflicts"
between these groups.333 In fact, according to one common interpretation of
pluralistic principles, pluralism requires the state to regulate and control the
participation of various associations.334 A commitment to diversity and
accommodation of different types of players means that the state can take
separate steps to support the sovereignty and flourishing of each distinct
category of players.335
To apply these principles here, a consistently pluralist legal structure
would support the participation of all types of associational groups, such as
both profit-seeking and nonprofit organizations, although not necessarily
without regulatory distinctions. The activity performed by nonprofits may
very well be different from the activity performed by for-profits. And thus,
according to pluralistic principles, while the state should accommodate both, it
may also regulate them in a way that distinguishes between the two.33 6
In contrast to the pluralistic thesis, in the "mediating institutions" view,
nonstate associations serve instrumental purposes. In this account, voluntary
331. See id.
332. Id. (quoting Frederic William Maitland, Translator's Introduction to OTTO GIERKE,
POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE, at vii, xxi (Frederic William Maitland trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1900)).
333. Id. at 393.
334. See Dagan, supra note 325, at 1429-30 (arguing that pluralistic interpretation of private
law is inconsistent with the noninterference approach to regulation); see also BERMAN,
supra note 325, at 18 (noting that the cosmopolitan pluralist theory he advances "need
not commit one to a worldview free from judgment, where all positions are equiva-
lently embraced" but instead argues for a set of "procedural mechanisms, institutions,
and practices that are more likely to expand the range of voices heard or considered");
cf Snyder, supra note 80, at 393 (arguing that the pluralistic thesis itself does not offer
guidance as to how to mediate conflicts and order relationships among associations but
rather just clarifies that the method we choose does not ultimately affect the status of
those human associations as formally equal).
335. See Dagan, supra note 325, at 1425-29.
336. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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associations exist to mediate conflicts in state/nonstate relationships, 337 for
instance "to influence, channel, or mask the power of the State." 338 As Franklin
Snyder argues, this "'mediating' institutions" conception is susceptible to
unprincipled instrumentalism:
If our goal is not the rampant flourishing of a rain forest of associations, but
rather the careful care and pruning of valuable plants in a well-tended garden, we
may ... argue over which associations should be privileged .... [But] that means
that the associations with the most political strength at the moment will likely be
favored.3 3 9
The literature on NGOs usually proceeds from an instrumental premise,
Snyder asserts, and "asks what beneficial ends mediating institutions serve in
their interactions with the State" in order to develop a theory of the legitimacy
or value of these associations' participation in the process. 340 This, Snyder says,
"work[s] backwards," as commentators "see something that they find valuable,"
observe "that these values are reflected or developed by certain associations,"
and then "tend to develop theories that these groups (though not others) should
be favored by (or at least protected from) the State." 34 1 A coherent legal
structure organized on the principle that associations mediate between states
and individuals must at least evidence consistent instrumentalism. In other
words, a "mediating institutions" legal structure would exhibit principled
consistency in the distinctions it makes between associations.
Consider how the consultancy regime fits within the two theoretical
structures offered here. The consultancy regime appears to be in large part
pluralist in that it makes very few hierarchical distinctions or classifications
among association type. Trade, religious, academic, and humanitarian
associations are all grouped together in the same "rain forest of associations."342
But the legal framework does make the one key instrumentalist distinction
337. Snyder, supra note 80, at 366 (explaining that the "mediat[ion]" imagines "a bipolar
world with the State at one end of the axis and the Individual at the other, with all the
other associations in society distributed between them"). Associations are imagined to
"mediat[e]" because they "occup[y] a middle position" and are "interposed between the
extremes" of the state and the individual;.they "interpose between parties in order to
reconcile them or to interpret them to each other." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1402 (1981)).
338. Id. at 399.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 366.
341. Id. at 379.
342. Id. at 399; see also Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 362 (stating that "NGOs compete with
other actors in a dynamic marketplace of ideas" and "nongovernmental 'competition'
could lead to a richer WTO politics, which could help improve the effectiveness of the
WTO" (quoting Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade
Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 123, 135-37
(1998))).
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that is under scrutiny here: that between business associations and other kinds
of associations. This distinction is odd in the pluralistic account as, in at least
some formulations of that account, there is no principled way to distinguish
between business entities and other types of voluntary associations. All are
"aggregations of people and property working together to accomplish
particular purposes."343 This distinction in the consultancy rules implicitly
reflects the value that only associations that pursue agendas other than the
profit agenda provide acceptable inputs. Putting aside for a moment the
legitimacy of that decision,344 the distinction itself exhibits an instrumental
preference for some associational inputs over others.
The consultancy legal structure thus seems to be incoherently theorized,
with tendencies toward both pluralism and instrumentalism-or, that is, a
"mediating institutions" account. A consistently pluralist legal structure would
support diverse types of associational groups, even if it makes some regulatory
distinctions between them. A structure that embraces instrumentalism must
account for why it has chosen the particular viewpoints it seeks to embrace.
The consultancy rules instead are inconsistent. They express an instrumental-
ist desire to admit associations that pursue the aims and purposes of the United
Nations, exhibit good internal governance, and offer a balanced set of
perspectives between the global north and south. Beyond that, they embrace
pluralism, admitting all associations except business entities.345 The choice of
business organizations as the only category of excluded associational group
aside from states themselves suggests an inconsistent undertheorized
instrumentalism.
This normative, theory-based critique points toward reforms that would
permit more direct access by business entities. These reforms would ease the
343. Snyder, supra note 80, at 378.
344. The distinction may express a fear of corruption by corporate influences-that
admitting businesses directly through the consultancy regime will give them outsized
influence in international negotiations. As the Tobacco Report makes clear, corporate
influence can have detrimental impacts on international lawmaking processes. See
supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. The concern about undue corporate
influence could be heightened by the fact that businesses are likely playing a two-level
game-lobbying both at the national and international levels. On the other hand, the
distinction seems to be out of step with the "triple bottom line" approaches of many
modern business entities that seek social goods alongside profit, see Dadush, supra note
310, at 148; the fact that businesses can also benefit the international lawmaking
process, see Durkee, supra note 6; and the reality that many business entities are actively
involved in developing regulation at the national and international levels, inde-
pendently or alongside states, see supra note 285 and accompanying text.
345. The de jure and de facto rules may diverge here, with the de facto rules significantly
more political in nature. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the political nature of the
gatekeeping process).
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conceptual incoherence by eliminating undertheorized rules that serve
unintended instrumentalist ends and move the needle toward pluralism.
D. Legal Reform
While a fully developed proposal is beyond the scope of this Article, the
foregoing analysis does offer a set of guiding principles for future reforms. To
be clear, the aim here is not to close the conversation but rather to open it: to
identify productive avenues for systematic empirical research and point the
way toward constructive analysis and reform. This Subpart first identifies the
principles to arise from the foregoing analysis and then, drawing from those
principles, offers two potential avenues for reform.
1. Principles
First, this research supports a strong hypothesis that covert business access
is harmful. It is potentially harmful to officials and lawmakers receiving
consultation because it obscures the identities of the true consultants, making it
more difficult for them to weigh the merits of the input they receive.3 46 It also
reduces the capacity of lawmakers to determine whether they have received
input from a representative range of sources and thus achieved a process with
input legitimacy.347 Covert business access is potentially harmful to NGOs
because it diminishes the capacity of captured NGOs to hold to their missions
and casts suspicion on all NGOs, whether captured or not, thus heightening
concerns expressed throughout the literature about the legitimacy and
accountability of their participation as consultants. 348 It is potentially harmful
to big businesses because it interposes an obstacle to communicating with
lawmakers directly, which could filter the message and increase the cost.
Finally, it may be harmful to small businesses, whose trade associations are co-
opted by major multinational players in search of a consultant association to
pass along messages to lawmakers.349
It is also possible that a lack of transparency is not always harmful-that
there is a benefit to allowing businesses and NGOs to consult with each other
prior to the time that those NGOs interpose their comments through the
consultation procedure. This nontransparent initial consultation process
could, hypothetically, improve downstream outcomes, tempering the NGO
positions, business interests, or both. The outcome could be more pragmatic
positions that are more acceptable to the relevant business interests than the
346. See supra Part II.C.2.
347. See supra Part II.C.2.
348. See sources cited supra note 25 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
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NGO would have otherwise advanced; it could also result in more public-
regarding versions of those business perspectives than those businesses would
advance on their own. Perhaps this initial discussion and crystallization of
positions is more effective when accomplished out of the public eye. If so, some
degree of nontransparency may be useful. The merits of this hypothesis could
be tested further through research concerning the ways NGOs and nonprofit
trade and industry associations develop positions internally prior to advancing
them through the consultancy process.
Second, the current consultancy rules, which force businesses to consult
through nonprofits, fail to guard against (and may even provoke) capture,
mission distortion, and covert behavior. The historical analysis of the previous
Subpart shows that while requiring any business contribution to be made
through nonprofits may have reasonably suited the respective capacities of
early twentieth-century businesses, nonprofits, and international organiza-
tions, times have changed. Now, requiring businesses to speak through
nonprofits can lead to the astroturf activism distortions identified in this
Article. Many businesses are now fully capable of acting independently, and
their interests are not always suitable for aggregation, even transparently
through a trade association. As Stephen Tully points out, aggregating business
interests in trade associations makes it "difficult to identify which business
interlocutor reflects dominant corporate opinion . ... Business and industry is
incorrectly assumed to possess a coherent voice as determined by organization-
al attributes and operational specialization." 350
Third, in some cases, direct business access to international officials and
lawmakers (not mediated through nonprofit NGOs and industry associations)
may be the better course of action. The reasons for this include the fact that, as
the case studies presented above suggest, excluding them can lead to covert
access and all the identified attendant harms.35 1 In other words, closing the
door to business access points those entities to the proverbial window. It is also
inefficient and impracticable to expect gatekeepers with limited capacities to
extricate business influence that flows covertly through alternate channels,
and offering direct access could reduce this flow.352 Moreover, as a matter of
normative theory, excluding business would move away from the pluralistic
approach to admitting associations that the U.N. access rules appear to
affirm.353 This exclusion would require a coherent defense. Also, businesses can
have valuable benefits to offer, including expertise, neutral resolutions to
geopolitically sensitive problems, and an understanding of the practicality of
350. TULLY, supra note 106, at 220-21.
351. See supra Part II.B.
352. See supra Part III.B.
353. See supra Part 11I.C.
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proposed rules.354 Finally, enlisting business input at the lawmaking stage can
facilitate compliance down the line. 355
Of course, direct business access to officials and lawmakers could also have
detrimental effects, including overrepresentation of business voices, an
appearance of special treatment of businesses, and an appearance of corruption
and reduced legitimacy of the lawmaking process. Direct input by businesses
could also exacerbate inequities between representation from actors in the
global north and south or overrepresent voices from a particular country or
region-inequities that the Council has in the past tried to reduce. These
countervailing concerns suggest that an effective legal reform must carve a
careful middle ground to capture the benefits businesses can offer to the
lawmaking process while restraining the harms.
2. Implementation
While the exact characteristics of a reformed approach to incorporating
and restraining business input at the United Nations will require further study
and analysis, I now suggest two potential approaches, together with some
preliminary assessments about their benefits and shortcomings.
Reform Approach A- Disclosure. One potential avenue for reform would rely
solely on an increased disclosure regime. Such a disclosure regime could
require, among other things, disclosure by NGOs and industry associations of
any known affiliations of board members and more robust disclosure of any
funding by corporate sources. A reform premised on disclosure would have to
focus not just on what is disclosed but also on how best to enhance the
effectiveness of the disclosures-including the disclosures already required as
well as any additional disclosures. Because it is clear that the capacities of the
NGO Committee gatekeepers are bounded, 356 one way to enhance the
effectiveness of any disclosures could be to make them more publicly available,
perhaps on an easily searchable website accessible to the public. In this way,
interested journalists, activists, NGOs, and other businesses could investigate
potential mixed interests and bring them to the attention of gatekeepers and
the officials and lawmakers at the receiving end of consultation. Another
benefit of a disclosure regime is that it would not disturb mutually beneficial
relationships between NGOs and business actors that can secure funding
streams for NGOs and potentially temper and reform business contributions to
the process. 357
354. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 315-21 and accompanying text.
357. For a more extended discussion of this tempering point, see Part II.C.4 above.
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Another benefit of an enhanced disclosure regime is that it could help
officials and lawmakers better trace the origins and purposes of input they
receive and ameliorate accountability and legitimacy problems. It would also
help lawmakers ensure that they have secured input from a range of different
viewpoints.
Disclosure alone, however, has limits. For example, a reform that incorpo-
rated only enhanced disclosures would not address the concerns that
aggregating corporate positions through industry associations reduces the
clarity and effectiveness of corporate contributions that could otherwise assist
the lawmaking process. It is also only effective when others have an incentive
to monitor the disclosures and the capacity to effectively use the disclosures in
a productive way.
Reform Approach B: Accreditation Track for Business. Another potential
approach to reform would involve allowing businesses direct access to officials
and lawmakers, perhaps through a separate regulatory pathway for business
consultants. This pathway could include individual business entities. It could
also include the nonprofit associations that support profit-seeking entities,
which previously have been lumped together with NGOs-such as industry
and trade associations. 358 Or the pathway could include just one or the other.
A separate regulatory pathway offers the possibility for separate regula-
tions for profit-seeking entities on the one hand and NGOs in the traditional
track on the other. This could include a separate application process,
accreditation criteria, and admission procedures, 359 all of which could be
tailored to promote goals appropriate to members of the business community.
For example, applicants could be required to commit to the United Nations
Global Compact or make other commitments. Once accredited, businesses and
business groups could have tailored access rights to lawmakers. That is, the
rules could be structured to offer profit-seeking entities more or less access
than NGOs in the traditional NGO track. For example, profit-seeking entities
could have greater or fewer speaking minutes, agenda items, and written
358. Note that this proposed reform shares features with the consultancy structure
established by the UNFCCC in that it proposes separate regulatory pathways for
business entities and public interest NGOs. See UNFCCC, Non-Governmental
Organization Constituencies 1-2, http://unfccc.int/files/parties-and-observers/ngo/
application/pdf/constituencies-and-you.pdf (outlining the UNFCCC constituency
group accreditation process). However, it departs from the UNFCCC context in a
significant respect: in the UNFCCC context business entities must always register
through NGOs, and there is no consultancy pathway that they can access directly as
profit-seeking entities. See id.
359. Cf TULLY, supra note 106, at 207 (noting that "entry hurdles could always be lifted" by,
for example, "information disclosure (such as reporting or financial accounting),
enhanced transparency requirements or further accountability (including democratic
decisionmaking or independent oversight)").
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submissions than NGOs in different contexts. A dual-track approach would
also provide different disclosure rules for profit-seeking entities than for
NGOs, including type, quantity, and frequency of reports and disclosures. The
regulations applicable to profit-seeking entities could simply be different from
those for NGOs and tailored to the legitimacy and appearance of corruption
concerns, as well as the distinctive benefits businesses could offer the process.
Just as with the disclosure regime, one benefit of opening a separate access
pathway is that it could help officials and lawmakers get a better sense of the
origins and purposes of the input they are receiving, and it could help them
ensure that contributions by entities with a profit motive are not overrepre-
sented in their deliberative process.
There are a number of potential difficulties and regulatory challenges that
the separate regulatory pathway would present. The pathway could open the
door to a flood of new would-be consultants, overwhelming gatekeepers and
lawmakers. That tide, however, could be stemmed by access barriers that
would encourage (or require) smaller players to aggregate into associations.
One concern, however, is that the new business consultants could also crowd
out the contributions of other members of civil society. The separate track
might allow businesses to exert too much pressure on lawmakers by, for
example, flooding them with an "obfuscatory level of detail." 360 This concern
might be ameliorated by carefully toggling access rights between business
consultants on the one hand and other members of civil society on the other.
Theoretically, at least, with a dual-track approach, access rights for each group
of actors could be controlled separately, so inputs by business entities and other
actors may be better balanced.
While the foregoing concerns permit ready answers, three additional
problems pose more fundamental difficulties that may disqualify a reform
based on a separate accreditation track and militate instead toward a reform
focused principally on disclosure:
First, there is often a very deep blending between business interests and
other interests, with profit-seeking entities promoting public-regarding goals
like clean energy or sustainable development and nonprofit entities relying
heavily on corporate sponsorship for their survival. Is it possible to direct these
entities into one track or another? Clearly, the separation would not be
entirely clean. However, forming a separate regulatory pathway would give
gatekeepers, lawmakers, and other observers (such as other NGOs) a clear
response and means of eradicating astroturf activism when it is discovered: the
profit-promoting NGO can simply be required to re-register in the alternative
for-profit track, thereby exposing and rendering explicit the motive animating
that entity's contributions.
360. Id. at 221.
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A second concern, related to the prior "blending" concern, is that a separate
pathway would not actually eliminate the astroturf activism phenomenon.
Instead, it would give businesses a way to register as consultants individually,
while failing to deter them from simultaneously engaging in astroturf
activism-that is, co-opting NGOs that are registered in the traditional way.
The issue is as follows: Might businesses simply register in the for-profit track
while continuing current partnerships or capture of NGOs, thereby engaging
in both astroturf activism and direct advocacy at the same time? After all, there
may be many reasons why a business would prefer for its positions to be
articulated through NGO mouthpieces. This concern suggests that a regulatory
pathway solution may not be effective unless it is accompanied by an enhanced
disclosure requirement that is designed to ferret out corporate-NGO links that
cross a designated threshold of intensity.
Third, accreditation gatekeepers are already taxed by a flood of NGOs
seeking access. Without an alternate source of funding or administrative
capacity, how could gatekeepers administer yet another accreditation track?
Despite these difficulties, a reform featuring a separate accreditation track
does offer one clear benefit: a separate accreditation track for business would
avoid an extension of consultation rights to profit-seeking entities. Some
commentators have observed a nascent "right" to consult with international
organizations or a duty of international organizations to consult with the
public,36 1 or they have proposed a right to consult as a normative matter. 362
But if individual businesses speak through NGOs and business associations
count among those NGOs, then affording NGOs a right to consult confers
participatory rights on businesses. Affording businesses a right to consult or
assigning international organizations a duty to consult with businesses
constitutes extending participatory rights to businesses in much the same way
as American constitutional doctrine, including Citizens United v. FEC,363 has
recognized expressive rights for corporate persons in the United States. A
separate regulatory pathway could prevent this otherwise seemingly inevitable
result. It would instead ensure that businesses are afforded a type and quantum
of access that is distinct from that of the remainder of civil society.
In sum, the two potential reform approaches offered here are preliminary
and require further development and study. Both, however, offer potential
361. Charnovitz, supra note 26, at 368-72.
362. See, e.g., Charnovitz, supra note 62, at 909-10.
363. 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
267
Astroturf Activism
69 STAN. L. REV. 201 (2017)
regulatory means to respond to the astroturf activism phenomenon. They offer
the potential to allow gatekeepers, officials, and lawmakers to better trace lines
of accountability, incorporate diverse perspectives into their deliberative
processes, and facilitate a legitimate lawmaking process.
Conclusion
International law is at a crossroads. Increasingly powerful multinational
business entities demand access to the lawmaking process, but international
law has not developed adequate responses to that demand. The failures flow
from profound changes in the relationships between nation-states and business
entities over the past century. Now, business entities-sometimes rivaling
nation-states in size and economic status-produce law as well as consume it.
They serve as co-regulators domestically, standard setters internationally, and
governors of their own supply chains around the world. Yet they are shut out
of formal international lawmaking processes. Rather than sit idly by,
businesses use the access points available to them, however awkward the fit.
One result is the astroturf activism phenomenon, rife with accountability,
efficiency, legitimacy, and access problems. As I have argued, the astroturf
activism phenomenon is the product of a legal relic: an old regime that has
failed to accommodate a new set of facts. It also serves as a case study for a
larger challenge: Can foundational international legal rules be updated to
accommodate rapidly changing relationships between business entities and
nation-states? International law can respond to this challenge or slip into
dysfunction and obsolescence. Because major international problems require
successful multilateral collaboration, the outcome of stasis is failure. But if the
astroturf activism analysis is a case study, it is also a blueprint. The key is to
unearth business influence, so as to capture the benefit and minimize the harm.
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